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Abstract 
In September 2011 in Rome at the International Society for Cultural and Activity Research conference, 
Eugene Matusov (USA), Kiyotaka Miyazaki (Japan), Jayne White (New Zealand), and Olga Dysthe (Norway) 
organized a symposium on Dialogic Pedagogy. Formally during the symposium and informally after the symposium 
several heated discussions started among the participants about the nature of dialogic pedagogy. The uniting theme 
of these discussions was a strong commitment by all four participants to apply the dialogic framework developed by 
Soviet-Russian philosopher and literary theoretician Bakhtin to education. In this special issue, Eugene Matusov 
(USA) and Kiyotaka Miyazaki (Japan) have developed only three of the heated issues discussed at the symposium in 
a form of dialogic exchanges (dialogue-disagreements). We invited our Dialogic Pedagogy colleagues Jayne White 
(New Zealand) and Olga Dysthe (Norway) to write commentaries on the dialogues. Fortunately, Jayne White kindly 
accepted the request and wrote her commentary. Unfortunately, Olga Dysthe could not participate due to her prior 
commitments to other projects. We also invited Ana Marjanovic-Shane (USA), Beth Ferholt (USA), Rupert Wegerif 
(UK), and Paul Sullivan (UK) to comment on Eugene-Kiyotaka dialogue-disagreement. 
 The first two heated issues were initiated by Eugene Matusov by providing a typology of different conceptual 
approaches to Dialogic Pedagogy that he had noticed in education. Specifically, the debate with Kiyotaka Miyazaki 
(and the other two participants) was around three types of Dialogic Pedagogy defined by Eugene Matusov: 
instrumental, epistemological, and ontological types of Dialogic Pedagogy. Specifically, Eugene Matusov subscribes 
to ontological dialogic pedagogy arguing that dialogic pedagogy should be built around students’ important existing or 
emergent life interests, concerns, questions, and needs. He challenged both instrumental dialogic pedagogy that is 
mostly interested in using dialogic interactional format of instruction to make students effectively arrive at preset 
curricular endpoints and epistemological dialogic pedagogy that is most interested in production of new knowledge for 
students. Kiyotaka Miyazaki (and other participants) found this typology not to be useful and challenged the values 
behind it. Kiyotaka Miyazaki introduced the third heated topic of treating students as “heroes” of the teacher’s 
polyphonic pedagogy similar to Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel based on Bakhtin’s analysis. Eugene Matusov took 
issue with treating students as “heroes” of teacher’s polyphonic pedagogy arguing that in Dialogic Pedagogy students 
author their own education and their own becoming.  
 Originally, we wanted to present our Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy in the following format. An initiator of a 
heated topic develops his argument, the opponent provides a counter-argument, and then the initiator has an 
opportunity to reply with his “final word” (of course, we know that there is no “final word” in a dialogue). However, after 
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Eugene Matusov developed two of his heated topics, Kiyotaka Miyazaki wanted to reply to both of them in one unified 
response, rather than two separate replies. Jayne White, Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Beth Ferholt, and Paul Sullivan 
wrote commentaries about the entire exchange and these commentaries should be treated as part of our Dialogue on 
Dialogic Pedagogy. We hope that readers, interested in Dialogic Pedagogy, will join our heated Dialogue-
Disagreement and will introduce more heated topics. 
 
 
Part I 
Instrumental vs. ontological dialogic pedagogy 
(by Eugene Matusov) 
Several of my colleagues, interested in dialogic pedagogy, have been asking me about the 
differences between “instrumental dialogic pedagogy” and “ontological dialogic pedagogy” – the terms 
that I used in my (Matusov, 2009a) book “Journey into Dialogic Pedagogy” and elsewhere. In brief, I 
introduced the terms “instrumental” and “ontological” in reference to diverse versions of Dialogic 
Pedagogy because I have noticed two important tendencies 1   in educational practices and their 
conceptualization, when scholars and practitioners, talk about pedagogical dialogue. In an instrumental 
dialogic tendency, educationalists (i.e., educational practitioners and scholars of education) use 
pedagogical dialogue in order to increase the likelihood of achieving essentially non-dialogic educational 
and non-educational means like: increasing test scores and learning outcomes (Brown, 1997; Johnson & 
Johnson, 1991), deepening students’ understanding of facts learned outside of pedagogical dialogue 
(Adler, 1982; Burbules, 1993; Plato & Bluck, 1961), promoting students’ motivation 
(http://www.paideia.org), or engaging students in an analysis of social injustices (Freire, 1978, 1986; 
Paley, 1992). I define “non-dialogic educational means” as preset curricular endpoints, at which students 
have to arrive. Preset endpoints contradict open-ended spirit of dialogue, in which all participants — 
teachers and students — genuinely interested in topics, issues, and inquiries they discuss. My list of non-
dialogic ends, for which instrumental pedagogical dialogue is used, is probably incomplete – I just listed 
what I have noticed. In instrumental approaches, the notion of pedagogical dialogue can be rather 
diverse: from simple meaning any discussion with short dialogic turns (i.e., dialogue as a genre of 
speaking) to a rather elaborate format of leading investigation as it is in a Socratic Method. I have 
observed the following characteristics of an instrumental approach to dialogic pedagogy: 
1. Pedagogical dialogue serves as an effective means for non-dialogic ends, which are understood outside 
of the notion of dialogue, within a monological framework; 
2. Pedagogical dialogue is viewed as a self-contained instructional method (strategy) and activity among 
other (non-dialogic) instructional methods (strategies) and activities (e.g., "didactic instruction of factual 
information", see Adler, 1982), “Dialogue is an activity directed toward discovery and new 
understanding, which stands to improve the knowledge, insight, or sensitivity of its participants” 
(Burbules, 1993, p. 8); 
3. Pedagogical dialogue can and should be switched on and off depending on the instructional needs; 
4. Certain curriculum is better to be taught and learned through pedagogical dialogue but certain 
curriculum is not (e.g., it is better to use pedagogical dialogue for learning "ideas, concepts, and values" 
but not for learning "factual knowledge and skills", Adler, 1982); 
                                                       
1 I think Alexander Sidorkin has also noticed a similar difference (Sidorkin, 1999) but he used less differentiated terms, in my 
judgment. 
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5. Pedagogical dialogue is aimed at efficient achievement of curricular endpoints preset by the teacher 
and/or State (e.g., understanding that the definition of virtues is more important than the issue of their 
origin – Socrates; unconditional inclusion is the basis for the social justice – Paley; following the Party’s 
directives is the way to freedom and prosperity – Freire). 
In contrast, ontological approaches to dialogic pedagogy emphasize that both meaning making 
process and humanity are essentially dialogic and, thus, penetrating all aspects of pedagogy/education 
(Bakhtin, 1986, 1999; Buber, 1996, 2000; Sidorkin, 1999), 
The dialogic nature of consciousness, the dialogic nature of human life itself. The single adequate 
form for verbally expressing authentic human life is the open-ended [i.e., “unfinalized” – EM] dialogue. Life by its 
very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, 
and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, 
hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse 
enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 293, italics is original). 
Ontological dialogue generates its own unfinalized dialogic values by searching for and testing 
ideas and values against other ideas and values (cf. Aristotelian notion of praxis, see Aristotle, 2000; 
Carr, 2006). Ontological dialogue has its own dialogic value in itself as the inherently valuable way of 
being, non-reducible to any other ways of being. Let me illustrate this point with my colleague’s and mine 
research on “instrumental learning” vs. “ontological learning”.  
My undergraduate student Daniella (Muller) Eilif and I conducted a study of “instrumental” and 
“ontological” learning (Matusov, Eilif, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2014, submitted). Daniella and I interviewed 
people of diverse age (from 9 to 75), gender, educational levels, professions, ways of life, and socio-
economic status from three countries: US (21), Russia (17), and Brazil (21) posing to them the following 
hypothetical question, “Imagine scientists invented Magic Learning Pills so people can learn 
instantaneously what has been known in the past and become skillful in any area of known practice. For 
what kind of learning would you want to use the Magic Learning Pills and for what kind of learning would 
you reject the Magic Learning Pills? Why?” Very few respondents said they would take the magic pill to 
acquire skills and knowledge. Similarly, few respondents said they would always reject the magic pill. Our 
major finding was that a high majority of interviewees reported two types of desired learning: 1) 
instrumental learning, for which they would want to take the Magic Learning Pill and 2) ontological 
learning, for which they would reject taking the Magic Learning Pill2. In instrumental learning, the learning 
itself is not valued, but actually disvalued, focusing on the desired ends. In instrumental learning, the 
process of learning is often viewed negatively as time-consuming, effort-consuming, frustrating, 
humiliating, painful, involving rote memorization of facts, boring, uneventful, annoying, scary, confidence 
eroding, financially expensive, well-defined, limited in time and space, measurable, finalized, and so on. 
Instrumental learning exists outside of people and does not transform the people – it can be separated 
and extracted from people and their life into a “magic learning pill” and passed to other people. After 
instrumental learning people essentially remain the same (i.e., “people + knowledge/skills”). Instrumental 
learning is about acquiring preset curricular endpoints (i.e., curricular standards). Instrumental learning is 
poiesis, i.e., a process, which quality is judged by the criteria established outside of the process, i.e., by 
achieving preset endpoints (Aristotle, 2000; Carr, 2006).  
                                                       
2 We also got more complicated cases of instrumental responses insisting on NOT taking the Magic Learning Pill because it may devalue their 
learning achievements and/or values of their knowledge and/or skill mastery that give them a special social status in their social groups or in the 
entire society. Knowledge and mastery can provide important scarcity that can be a basis for a desired social status. 
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In contrast, in ontological learning, the learning process has an intrinsic value in itself and can be 
viewed positively as pleasure; interesting challenge (including even frustration and pain); “curious 
wonder” (Taylor, 1968); deep, bottomless, unfinalized understanding; dialogic relationship with important 
others; growth; life itself; creativity; becoming somebody different; experiential; eventful (even at times 
through dramatic, painful, and tragic events); relational, valuing others; situational, ill-defined; 
immeasurable; not limited in time and space; unfinalized; and so on. As one interviewee justified why she 
would not take the Magic Learning Pill for her particular desired learning, “I don’t want to shorten my life.” 
In the ontological learning, the learning process is in itself a valuable event of the person’s life. 
Ontological learning cannot be separated from people because it defines people. Ontological learning 
defines learner’s becoming and transcending the ontologically and epistemologically given (and ready-
made culture). Ontological learning is praxis, i.e., a process defining its own criterion for its quality and 
virtues (Aristotle, 2000; Carr, 2006). 
In instrumental dialogue, life of the students and their education are often split – the students’ 
education is out of the students’ life as “preparation for life.” In contrast, in ontological dialogue they 
remain the same: education is life, life is education, (cf. Dewey’s famous statement “Education is not 
preparation for life; education is life itself…. Education, therefore, is a process of living and not a 
preparation for future living”). Ontological dialogue is inherently eventful, dramatic, and full of learning 
surprises for both the teacher and the students. Instrumental dialogue can also be eventful, dramatic, and 
surprising but these qualities are not essential for instrumental dialogue, they can be accidental and 
peripheral (if not annoying, from a point of view of instrumental learning, see a discussion of the notion of 
"off-script" in Kennedy, 2005).  
Alexander Sidorkin (1999) and I (Matusov, 2009a) argued that ontological dialogue penetrates all 
forms of human interaction and relations even in very distorted forms like in slavery (see Hegel & Baillie, 
1967, for Hegel's brilliant analysis of this distortion in slaveowners' dream for "an ideal slave"). Similarly, a 
Russian educationalist and scholar of ontological dialogue Alexander Lobok argues that one can find 
aspects and islands of ontological dialogue in any teaching (Lobok, 2001, 2008). However, ontological 
pedagogical dialogue becomes full-fledged when an educator realizes its value and tries to guide his or 
her pedagogical actions and pedagogical designs based on ontological dialogue.  
The notion of ontological dialogue, beyond its inherent emphasis on dialogue as the essence of 
life, is unfinalized and contested as it is defined itself through practice and dialogue about this practice 
among all its immediate and remote participants. However, in my view, even so unfinalized, it opposes all 
six distinguished characteristics of instrumental dialogue listed above: 
1. Pedagogical (ontological) dialogue is the end in itself, which cannot be understood outside of the notion 
of dialogue, “Dialogue is not something we do or use; it is relation that we enter into” (Burbules, 1993, p. 
xii, italics original); 
2. Although pedagogical (ontological) dialogue may incline to instructional conversation, it penetrates any 
form of instructional method, including lecture. A lecture can be dialogic if it is a long answer to students’ 
question or inquiry (pre-existing the lecture or emergent in the lecture); 
3. Pedagogical (ontological) dialogue is not a type of activity among other non-dialogic types of activities, 
but rather it is the participants’ orientation in any activity, specific value on dialogue as the meaning-
making process and humanity, and guidance for the teacher’s pedagogical actions and pedagogical 
designs; 
4. Pedagogical (ontological) dialogue, like meaning making or humanity, cannot and should not be 
switched on and off; 
5. Genuine education, as exploration of societal and personal values — praxis of praxis (Matusov & 
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Marjanovic-Shane, 2012) — occurs through pedagogical (ontological) dialogue; 
6. Pedagogical (ontological) dialogue defines its own emergent endpoints in the students as temporary 
outcomes embedded in dialogue. 
 To my big surprise, I found a similar opposition between two types of pedagogical dialogues in 
work by a Russian-American educational philosopher Alexander Sidorkin who was also influenced by 
Bakhtin (and Buber). In my judgment, our recognition of the two main approaches to dialogic pedagogies 
was identical. Even our terminology was very close as we both independently came to the notion of 
“ontological dialogue.” However, in contrast to me, Sidorkin called “non-ontological” what I call 
“instrumental”. Later, I have realized that this opposition between instrumental pedagogical dialogue and 
ontological pedagogical dialogue has to be revised. Initially, I thought that non-instrumental and 
ontological were synonymous. But currently, I have come to the conclusion that non-instrumental dialogic 
approaches constitute a bigger class of dialogic approaches, in which ontological dialogue is a part along 
with other non-instrumental but also non-ontological approaches. So far, I have recognized two more non-
instrumental, non-ontological dialogic approaches: Epistemological Dialogic Approach II and Ecological 
Dialogic Approach. I have also found diverse instrumental approaches that include: Epistemological 
Dialogic Approach I and Social Justice Dialogic Approach. These approaches appear in Figure 1 below 
and can also be viewed here http://diaped.soe.udel.edu/dp-map/?page_id=18.  
 
Figure 1. Dialogic and Conventional Pedagogies 
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Epistemological vs. ontological pedagogical dialogue 
(by Eugene Matusov) 
Epistemological pedagogical dialogue – a family of dialogic pedagogical approaches – prioritizes, 
purifies, and totalizes the intellectual endeavor of knowledge production over all other human endeavors 
including relational concerns and tensions; conflicts of desires; human ecology; issues of injustice; 
participants’ attractions, excitements, interests, and repellences (i.e., biases); aesthetics; vanity; ethics; 
responsibility; morality and so on – what I’d argue constitute the totality of human ontology. Of course, all 
these ontological aspects may be a focus of an intellectual investigation AND all of these ontological 
aspects have an intellectual component in each of them AND, finally, intellectual endeavors occur in 
ontological spaces. However, I argue that these ontological aspects cannot be reduced to intellectual 
decision making, and purification of intellectual endeavors from their ontological spaces and aspects is 
counterproductive, when applied comprehensively. For example, reduction of study of physics reduced 
only to development of intellectual ideas does not help to understand and appreciate the sociocultural and 
ontological nature of the practices — historical actors look like naïve or even stupid by ignoring “obvious” 
issues and arguments developed later after them (Kumar, 2008; Matusov, 2014). In my view, this issue 
alone is at the core of what separates epistemological3  dialogues from ontological dialogue.  
Using Aristotelian poiesis-praxis terminology (Aristotle, 2000; Carr, 2006), epistemological 
dialogue transforms a practice in poiesis, in which goal, endpoint, value, and virtue (i.e., what is good) are 
(firmly or somewhat) known in advance; while ontological dialogue considers a practice as praxis, in 
which goal, endpoint, value and virtue emerge in the activity itself. Because of this poiesis nature of 
practice in epistemological dialogue, it often pre-defines the virtue of its intellectual endeavor in the 
immutable hierarchy of the preset “good” over the preset “bad”: systemic thinking over syncretic thinking 
(Vygotsky, 1987); formal-operation thinking over preoperational thinking (Piaget, 1985); theoretical over 
concrete (Davydov, 2008); symphonic thinking over absurdist thinking (see a description of an innovative 
school using this hierarchy in von Duyke, 2013); dialectical thinking over formal logical thinking (Ilyenkov, 
1977); high culture over low culture; advanced culture over primitive culture (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993). In 
contrast, in the praxis, the relationships between these oppositions can be very diverse – including the 
listed ones -- depending on local contexts and emerging values. 
Studying literature and practice of dialogic pedagogy, so far I have extracted two types of 
epistemological pedagogical dialogue: instrumental epistemological dialogue (Epistemological II) and 
non-instrumental epistemological dialogue (Epistemological II). 
Epistemologi ca l  instrumental  pedagogi ca l  dialogue (Epistemologi ca l  I)  
The epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy is probably the first published account of 
dialogic pedagogy that still remains very influential and important for all scholars and practitioners of the 
dialogic pedagogy field – namely Socratic Dialogue in Plato’s version. I am sure that it will remain an 
object of inspiration, analysis, and exciting discoveries (Phillips, 2002). Like Bakhtin (1999), I am rather 
ambivalent about it. I appreciate its focus on asking good questions, attendance to students’ subjectivity, 
focus on provocations and contradictions, disrupting familiar and often unreflected relations, dialogue at 
                                                       
3 My use of the word “epistemological” is metaphorical, impressionistic and not conceptual one — I try to capture and describe the 
phenomenon in Dialogic Pedagogy with this descriptor. 
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the threshold, being carnivalesque, and so on. But I am also, like Bakhtin, concerned with the teacher’s 
manipulation of the student’s consciousness and intellectualism (Matusov, 2009a). 
The epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy is characterized by the use of dialogue 
between the teacher and the students and among the students to achieve some particular intellectual 
curricular endpoints preset by the teacher. Dialogue here is a pedagogical method (e.g., Socratic Method) 
or an instructional strategy along with other pedagogical methods and instructional strategies, which can 
be switched on and switched off. Thus, both Adler (1982; 1984) and Burbules (1993) argue that 
presentation of a unfamiliar material or new information should be done by the teacher in a 
straightforward lecturing or in general direct instruction ways, while deepening understanding has to be 
done in a form of (Socratic) dialogue. Since the students do not have any prior knowledge of unfamiliar 
material, it does not make sense to dialogue about it, from this instrumental perspective. This approach to 
dialogue as a method can be traced in Plato’s Socrates when Socrates gives an example of giving 
directions to a certain place to someone as a task not worthy nor appropriate of dialogic investigation 
(e.g., see a dialogue between Meno and Socrates, Plato & Bluck, 1961). Thus, the epistemological 
instrumental pedagogy is primary concerned with deepening students’ intellectual understanding about 
something but this deepening has some curricular endpoints like, for example, in case of the Meno 
dialogue, that the virtue is problematic and inherited, or that by increasing the sides of a square twice, the 
area of the square will increase by four times. 
The dialogic method of the epistemological instrumental pedagogy is organized in a series of 
questions-answers usually initiated by the teacher (but not always) and often undergoes 4 phases: 
1. engaging the students in teacher-defined material – as the Meno dialogue shows, it can be quite a 
struggle because the students might have their own agendas and/or might not be immediately 
interested in teacher-defined issues; 
2. searching for and revealing misconceptions in the students’ subjectivity about the teacher-defined 
issues – this revelation is first done by the teacher him or herself as the students often are not aware 
that they have misconceptions and contradictions in their thinking and perception of the reality. Here is 
where a genuine dialogue is permissible and tolerable by the teacher; 
3. leading the students into numbing contradictions about their misconceptions (the so-called “torpedo 
touch”) – it is important to develop in the students a sense of paralysis from the revealed contradiction 
between two strong alternatives rooted in the students’ own subjectivity; all ways out suggested by the 
students should be convincingly blocked by the teacher; 
4. leading the students to the preset curricular endpoint as the only possible and logical solution of the 
contradiction – the teacher usually blocks any alternatives in themes and in solutions. Here is where 
genuine dialogue is usually less permitted and tolerated by the teacher. 
There is absence of the teacher’s epistemological learning in the dialogue – despite Socrates’ 
insistence about the benefits to his own learning I did not find evidence in any of Plato’s dialogues, that 
Socrates changed his mind or learned anything new that he did not know prior to the dialogues (Matusov, 
2009a, ch. 2). In instrumental epistemological pedagogical dialogue, a teacher may learn some new 
pedagogical knowledge about how to teach better — e.g., how the teacher can address better students’ 
old, known, and new, emerging, misconceptions — but not epistemological knowledge about intellectual 
subject matter, new inquiries previously unknown by the teacher (Matusov, 2009a, ch. 4). 
As in case of Plato’s Socrates, I suspect that the teacher’s manipulation of the students’ 
subjectivities often involves self-manipulation of the teacher’s own consciousness to truly believe that the 
preset curricular endpoint is the only possible and logical outcome. Indeed, it is a mathematical fact that 
the area of a square is equal to the square of its sides. What can be problematic there? But, as I showed 
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with the example of 2+2=4 (Matusov, 2009a), it is never the case – anything and everything is 
questionable and problematic if there is desire to look deeper: two friends plus two friends may not 
always be equal to four friends. As Bakhtin (1986) argued, understanding is bottomless. 
 Elsewhere I argued (Matusov, 2009a, ch. 2) that Plato’s Socratic Dialogic Method is a bizarre 
combination of radical pedagogical constructivism, based on dialogic investigation of truth though 
revealing contradictions in people’s thinking, and radical philosophical positivism, based on the preset 
curricular endpoints reflecting the eternal, universal ideas. Now, I wonder if this combination of radical 
pedagogical constructivism and radical philosophical positivism is a birthmark of any epistemological 
instrumental dialogic pedagogy. Since Socrates, this position has been reinforced by the Rationalism of 
the Enlightenment (the Modernism), according to which, reasonable, well-intended people with access to 
the same information will come to the same conclusion. The Modernist Rational mind has to be 
subordinate to the Iron Logic of the Universal Necessity and purify itself from any other irrational and 
corrupting influences like emotions, values, beliefs, responsibility, traditions, social justice, loyalties, 
vanities, reputations, and judgments (Matusov, 2014). In this approach, consensus and agreement are 
prioritized – reaching a rational consensus among rational people through the free marketplace of ideas is 
a proxy for reaching the Truth. When the rational consensus is reached, it sets a curricular endpoint for 
education.  
In my view, necessity is only an aspect of discourse and by itself it is shaped by other aspects 
(e.g., values, emotions) and as well penetrates them. People’s logic does not need to follow the necessity 
and does not need to slavishly submit to it because the necessity and logic are shaped people’s axiology 
(i.e., the value system), ontology, and ethics. The logic and necessity do not provide alibi-in-being using 
Bakhtin’s metaphor (1993) but require active authorship of values and commitments and responsibility, 
which is irreducible to logic and necessity (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2014, in press-a, 2014, in 
press-b). 
Finally, I want to comment on the elitist nature of the epistemological instrumental dialogic 
pedagogy. Since, the truth and power associated with it is rooted in the Dialogic Method of investigation, 
people who profess in the Method have to be on top of the society – this is a rather logical conclusion 
from the epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy. According to Plato’s Republic, the world has to 
be ruled by philosophers over all other “deficient” and “ignorant” people. 
Epistemologi ca l  non- instrumental  dialogue (Epistemologi cal  II)  
The epistemological non-instrumental dialogic pedagogy prioritizes the intellectual sublime of the 
high culture. It focuses on “the eternal damn final questions” (Bakhtin, 1999). It is interested in the 
mundane only because it can give the material and opportunity to move to the sublime (see Phillips, 
2002, as a good example). The non-instrumental epistemological dialogue is a purified dialogue to 
abstract a single main theme, a development of a main concept, and unfolding the logic – interested in 
purification of a dialogue into dia-logics (Berlyand, 2009; Bibler, 2009). Due to this purification, 
epistemological dialogue occurs in de-ontologized intellectual space and time.  
In my view, as a tool of a particular investigation of an ontological dialogue, this purification can 
be legitimate in certain situations. However, modeling classroom discussion after an epistemological 
dialogue can lead to pedagogical violence as a way of “disciplining the students’ minds” so they remain 
on the theme and only engage in the intellectual framework defined by the teacher, which is always the 
most important. It brackets the complexity, ontological massiveness, and interconnection of the diverse 
themes and makes certain “irrelevant” agendas, interests, strengths, desires, and ontological groundings 
Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy  
Eugene Matusov, Kiyotaka Miyazaki 
 
 
 
 
Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http:dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2014.121  |  Vol. 2 (2014) 
 
SI:ddp-9 
as inappropriate and illegitimate (which, in its own turn, requires policing the discourse and issuing 
punitive actions for violators of the epistemological regime). 
In my view, one of the good representations of the epistemological non-instrumental dialogue is 
Lakatos (1981). Lakatos starts his book on imaginary pedagogical dialogue about mathematical 
investigation with a very keen and thoughtful observation on his own endeavor. He ended his introduction 
to the book with the following words, “The dialogue form [in his book] should reflect the dialectic of the 
story [i.e., history of the discoveries and developments of math ideas]; it is meant to contain a sort of 
rationally reconstructed or ‘distilled’ history” (Lakatos, 1981, p. 5, italics is original). 
I want to focus on this nature of “distillation” or purification that Lakatos mentioned. Lakatos was 
talking about distillation, reconstruction, and purification of the history of the math practice, while I am 
interested in his distillation, reconstruction, and purification of ontological dialogue. History represents an 
ontological dialogue. But ontological dialogues can also be ahistorical and even imaginary (Dostoevsky’s 
novels present such examples).  
What are the differences between epistemological II and ontological non-instrumental dialogues? 
Let me start with making observational notes about their similarities. First, like epistemological non-
instrumental dialogue, ontological dialogue can also involve abstractions from, and reconstructions of, live 
conversations (and it can be entirely fictional). So, it is not focused on “exactness” that produces the 
difference, although it is true that ontological dialogue has more, what can be called, “life details.” 
Second, ontological dialogue can also focus on epistemological issues and intellectual investigations. 
Thus, it is not the thematic focus that makes the difference. Third, non-instrumental epistemological 
dialogues usually (or maybe even always) preserve particular voices and generate person-ideas, 
although in an epistemological dialogue, the person is subordinated to and deduced from the idea. 
Hence, the strong presence and depiction of particular rich voices does not distinguish ontological and 
epistemological dialogues. Fourth, both types of dialogues can promote (as well as deviate from) the 
regime of internally persuasive discourse (IPD) described by Bakhtin as open-ended honest search for 
truth by all participants (but not as a sense of “appropriation” of the teacher’s voice by the voices of the 
students, see instrumental dialogue) (Holquist, 1990; Matusov, 2007a; Matusov & von Duyke, 2010; 
Morson, 2004; Morson & Emerson, 1990). Fifth, they both can be carnivalistic with throning and 
dethroning the authority (Bakhtin, 1999; Sullivan, Smith, & Matusov, 2009). Sixth, both types of dialogues 
can involve dramas of ideas and people, although in an epistemological non-instrumental dialogue, 
drama of the ideas defines drama of the participants.  
I argue that the distillation, reconstruction, and purification nature of epistemological dialogue is 
about creation of the comprehensive, totalized, focus of all the participants of the dialogue on some 
unfolding theme (what is probably called by Berlyand, 1996; Bibler, 1997; Kurganov, 1989, as “a dialogic 
notion”). In contrast to ontological dialogue, epistemological non-instrumental dialogue is essentially 
mono-topic and comprehensive (i.e., universal and totalizing). Epistemological dialogues are self-
contained.  
Bakhtin (1999) defined voice that “includes a person’s worldview and fate. A person enters into 
dialogue as an integral voice. He participates in it not only with his thoughts, but with his fate and with his 
entire individuality” (Bakhtin, 1991, p. 293). The person’s fate cannot be reduced to one dialogue, to a 
person’s position in a dialogue, to the theme, to the logic, to the hierarchy, or to the sublime. Although, 
people can never be reduced to their mundane life circumstances, in which people are thrown and find 
themselves, the deeds that people made in these mundane circumstances penetrate and color the 
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sublime dialogue, which is the primary interest of the proponents of the non-instrumental epistemological 
dialogic pedagogy. For example, the mundane fact that a father of the American Revolution, Thomas 
Jefferson was a slaveowner until the end of his life (he owned 187 slaves), who fathered Black children 
who became slaves (he freed all of them before or after his death) from a slave concubine Sally Hemings 
(Sloan, 1998), colored his sublime position on freedom and equality to the point that has allowed some 
scholars to legitimately claim that Jefferson was not only a father of modern democracy but ALSO a 
father of modern racism since the practice of slavery, which Jefferson was a part of, and his claim that “all 
men are created equal” (written in the Declaration of Independence) required a justified exclusion of 
slaves from the notion of “men” – i.e., the ideology of racism (D'Souza, 1995). Jefferson’s voice and fate 
in a dialogue on freedom has been an uneasy intertwinement of the sublime freedom-loving philosopher 
and politician, and the mundane slaveowner, enslaving his own children and lover. 
Let me now turn to magnifying the differences between non-instrumental epistemological and 
ontological dialogues. First, epistemological dialogue does not involve an ontological meeting of the 
participants. Lakatos’ dialogue starts his epistemological dialogue with the following disclaimer: 
The dialogue takes place in an imaginary classroom. The class gets interested in a PROBLEM: is 
there a relation between the number of vertices V, the number of edges E and the number of faces F of 
polyhedra -- particularly of regular polyhedra -analogous to the trivial relation between the number of vertices 
and edges of polygons, namely, that there are as many edges as vertices: V = E? This latter relation enables us 
to classify polygons according to the number of edges (or vertices): triangles, quadrangles, pentagons, etc. An 
analogous relation would help to classify polyhedra (Lakatos, 1981, p. 6, italics is original). 
What is interesting here for me is that how this imaginary “class gets interested in a PROBLEM” 
is taken outside of the brackets of Lakatos’ dialogue. We do not know how and why this interest was 
developed and negotiated. We do not know how this interest is grounded in the participants’ lives. It is 
unclear why the participants care about the problem and what makes them care. What if some of the 
participants had not cared about this math problem, in particular, or math in general – how did Lakatos 
make them interested or, at least, cooperate with his dialogue? Was pedagogical violence (Matusov, 
2009a; Sidorkin, 2002) involved in the process and if so, how? What (and how) created conditions for this 
classroom? Could the participants have freedom to leave it at any moment (like participants of Socrates’ 
dialogues, for example)? Below, I will provide themes that are present in ontological dialogue and absent 
in epistemological dialogue. 
Frist, from a pedagogical point of view, an assumption or an expectation that all participants are 
automatically and non-problematically interested in a problem can lead to big pedagogical disasters and 
eventually to oppressive pedagogical violence. Yes, it is true that a common interest in a particular 
problem can emerge in the classroom but I argue that it usually required a lot of work from the teacher 
and/or it is relatively short lived and ecologically (i.e., emotionally, intellectually, physiologically, 
motivationally, and relationally) unsustainable. 
Second, there is no ontological diversity nor does it not intertwine with participants’ interests and 
agendas in epistemological dialogue. In Lakatos’s dialogue all the participants are totally committed to the 
problem set by the teacher. In contrast, in an ontological dialogue, the participants are involved in a 
problem space (usually consisting not only of one problem but of many dynamically emerging fuzzy 
tensions) that often has the shared and collective ownership, changing alliances, and diverse agendas. 
Thus, this problem space is often shaped by diverse, multiple, often fuzzy, uncertain, simultaneous and 
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dynamic ontological concerns by the participants. For example, in the case above, the participants might 
have multiple ontological concerns about fairness, grades, past interpersonal alliances and conflicts, 
making and maintaining friendships, explanation of percentages, academic motivation, sexual flirting, 
romantics, vanity, hunger, stomachaches, and so on. All of these apparently mundane concerns by the 
participants, – “the mundane noise”, – seem to be annoying for an educator working in the non-
instrumental epistemological dialogic pedagogy who wants to bracket and suppress them from the public 
space of the dialogue. 
Third, there are no ontological concerns in participants about their reputation that emerge in, and 
transcend, the epistemological dialogue. Dialogue can change people’s relationships, professional and 
institutional stands, careers, reputations, fates, fights for material resources; – it can open and close 
institutional, relational, and societal opportunities that might have little to do with the theme of the sublime 
dialogue at hand. All of that is often bracketed in epistemological dialogues, probably, as spoilers of the 
purity of the arguments. Nothing outside of epistemological dialogue, outside of its world of ideas, -- “pulp” 
of the life -- is a concern.  
Participants of an epistemological dialogue are often involved in drama, but it is a drama of pure 
intellectual ideas.  In Lakatos’ dialogue, student Alpha leaves the dialogue, slamming the door in disgust, 
so to speak. However, his dramatic actions can be deduced from the unfolding logic of colliding ideas in 
the dialogue, as an emotional amplifier of an intellectual point. People, their personalities, their actions, 
their relations are reduced to their ideas (cf. Bakhtin, 1999, on the notion of person-idea). They are 
puppets of the self-contained logical development. For example, some proponents of epistemological 
dialogue view the suicide by famous German quantum physicist Paul Ehrenfest in 1933, as a logical 
development of his position in a debate with Einstein and Bohr (Kurganov, personal communication, July 
2008) rather than as a possible tragic result of his struggle with chronic depression (Klein, 1985). 
Although, logic of intellectual development can probably define people’s fate in some (rare?) cases, it is 
doubtful that it can be the defining case in all, or even majority instances. However, in an epistemological 
non-instrumental dialogue, the participants’ ontology originates and is produced by the development of 
intellectual ideas. 
Fourth, there is no ontological urgency in an epistemological dialogue. The chronotope of 
epistemological dialogue is the world of ideas. Here-and-now ontological urgency of life is not known in 
epistemological dialogue. Arguments can be postponed for 300 years or even more. Epistemological 
dialogue can occur whenever and wherever. Historical time is bracketed, physical and embedded 
semiotic space is bracketed. Historical time with its ontological urgency is random, shallow, and 
unimportant (Lakatos placed his historical comments into footnotes, probably, in order not to interrupt the 
flow of his epistemological dialogue). 
Fifth, epistemological non-instrumental dialogue does not know interest in ontological ecology – 
only in the universal logical necessity (which can be multiple, according to Bibler, another proponent of 
the non-instrumental epistemological dialogic pedagogy, see Berlyand, 2009; Bibler, 2009). In contrast to 
the spirituality of the sublime, emphasized by the non-instrumental epistemological dialogue, the 
ontological ecology – the corporality of the mundane – is essentially non-dialogic but it can be pulled in a 
sphere of ontological dialogicity. For example, with aging, I have noticed that I become crankier, more 
irritable, impulsive, and even depressed in late evenings. Although, during these times in the evening, I’m 
feeling that I have a reason to be like this – something or somebody bothers me and gets on my nerves, -
- I have learned to know that it is probably a result of some biochemical imbalance in my body. In the 
morning, I often feel better: full of enthusiasm, optimism, patience, and sensitivity. I try to dialogize my 
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non-dialogic ecology by my attempts to use (not always successful) the famous Russian saying, “The 
morning is wiser than the evening” and not to make important relational decisions in the evening. 
Epistemological dialogue does not know ecological concerns, rather it mandates its regime of mono-topic 
total commitment and purity of the spiritual sublime.  
Sixth, despite all assurance of the contrary (Phillips, 2002), the overall contempt for the mundane 
that the non-instrumental epistemological dialogic pedagogy expresses generates a kind of elitism with its 
all moral, ethical, and political consequences. If “unexamined life is not worth living” (Socrates-Plato), the 
worth of life and, ultimately the person living this life, is defined by the degree of how much a person can 
be a dialogic epistemological philosopher, examining his or her own life and the lives of others. The 
intellectual discourse on life – it is discursive examination, – becomes more important than the life itself 
(examined or unexamined) (see for a more discussion of this point in Kukathas, 2003). Using Aristotle’s 
(2000) terms, the episteme overrules the phronêsis (and the techné and the sophia).  The epistemological 
dialogue is not focused on just on any dialogue but only on the sublime dialogue of High Cultures. Thus, 
Bibler’s idea for school as “The School of the Dialogue of Cultures” can be characterized as “The School 
of the Dialogue of High Cultures” (see my debate on this issue with Irina Berlyand in Matusov, 2009b). A 
mundane chat or mundane activities might have different but still important wisdom than a philosophical 
discussion of the sublime – not to make wisdom the absolute acme of all other possible values and 
virtues. 
I think that epistemological non-instrumental dialogue can inform, inspire, and provoke an 
ontological dialogue. Ontological dialogue can be legitimately studied by reducing it to an epistemological 
non-instrumental dialogue (e.g., for tracking the logic of some particular theme unfolding in a dialogue). 
But epistemological non-instrumental dialogue cannot, and should not, guide ontological dialogue, 
especially in education, because in my view, the pedagogical regime of epistemological dialogue with its 
insistence on the “discipline of the mind” based on the total commitment of the mono-topic development 
of an idea and bracketing the ontology of the participants cannot be supported without relying on 
pedagogical violence. People cannot simply and totally commit all their time to the development of one 
theme, by themselves without an external violent push on them. 
Ontolog i cal  pedagogi cal  dialogue 
As far as I know the term “ontological dialogue” was coined by educational philosopher Alexander 
Sidorkin (1999) as opposition to other understandings of the notion of dialogue such as “instrumental 
dialogue”, “epistemological dialogue”, “communicational dialogue”, “linguistic dialogue” and so on. 
Sidorkin argues,  
Notion of dialogue is treated [in an ontological understanding of dialogue – EM] as central 
for defining human existence, not merely a form of communication. To experience what it means 
to be human, one needs to engage in dialogical relations. We are human in the fullest sense 
when we engage in dialogue. This ontological understanding of dialogue has its implications for 
education. I argue that schools should focus on helping children experience and learn what it 
means to be human. Therefore, the entire social arrangement called "school" should be designed 
around this purpose of introducing children to the life of dialogue (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 4). 
The word ontological does not refer to just any kind of being, neither does it deal with the 
existence of dialogue; it refers specifically to human existence. This may not be the most 
conventional use of the term, but from my point of view, it is the most accurate one. The 
ontological concept of dialogue explores the place of dialogue in the human way of being. One of 
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the reasons for using the adjective ontological is a need to distinguish between what I propose 
and a number of non-ontological concepts of dialogue. In the context of this book, the very 
existence of a human being in his or her human quality is a result of dialogue. In the non-
ontological conception of dialogue, this relation between dialogue and human existence is 
reversed: dialogue is treated as secondary to human existence, mainly as a form of 
communication (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 7). 
Let me provide my understandings and inferences from Sidorkin’s deep and dense definition: 
1. I understand the polysemic notion of ontology, “human being”, “human existence”, as our big and small 
ethical deeds (“поступки,” “postupki” in Russian) and relations with others that define us in the world 
that we create, find ourselves, and in which we are thrown. Ontology has priority over epistemology – 
i.e., what and how we know about the world (i.e., epistemology) is a part of our being in the world (i.e., 
ontology). Ontology is charged with ethic, moral, judgment, politics, aesthetics, desire, will, emotions, 
responsibility, and so on. Epistemology is embraced by ontology, “How we breathe is how we write” 
(Soviet poet Bulat Okudzhava’s lyrics) but not the other way around despite the fact that ontology is 
often the object of investigation by epistemology, which may affect the ontology (which is why critical 
ontological dialogue can be so important).   
2. Ontological dialogue penetrates all aspects of the human existence, “Buber and Bakhtin, like 
Copernicus, discovered the new center of the human universe, the dialogical. It is the center in a sense 
that the very fact of human existence is contingent upon engagement in dialogical relations. An 
individual may exist as an organism in a physical or a biological sense. But we are truly human only 
when we are in a dialogical relation with another. The most important things in human lives happen 
between human beings, rather than within or without them” (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 11). Ontological dialogue 
penetrates both minute, routine, mundane, as well as the big scale time and the sublime. It does not 
have a beginning or an end. It penetrates even evil deeds like slavery (see Hegel's analysis of the 
Master's dream desire about his Slave full of dialogicity, in Hegel & Baillie, 1967). Any teaching, even, 
super conventional and monologic, is penetrated by ontological dialogue (Lobok, 2001, 2008). 
Oppressive regimes generate distorted ontological dialogue. 
3. The concept of ontological provides two major frameworks: descriptive (i.e., how things are, see #2 
above) and prescriptive, normative (i.e., how things should be). The prescriptive framework of 
ontological dialogue is usually defined by two concerns: humanity and critical overtaking of human 
affairs in their social and natural life. 
 
“Show me onto log i ca l  dialogue”:  Ontolog i ca l  dialogue as a descr ipt ive ,  methodolog i ca l  
f ramework 
Where is ontological dialogue? Show it to me, please! Otherwise, everything sounds like 
philosophical mumbo-jumbo blah-blah-blah: it sounds good but what does it mean in practice? How to 
grab it? How to study it? Give me something concrete and point at that something and say, “This is 
ontological dialogue because….”! Operationalize “ontological dialogue” for me! 
I do not try to mystify ontological dialogue but it is different from traditional methodology of 
“operationalization”. To some degree, ontological dialogue surrounding us in our everyday life, is too 
common and too familiar to be noticed. Ontological dialogue is not in the text but always between the 
beholder and other people. Let me provide an example to provoke and engage you, my reader, in what I 
mean: 
More than twenty-five years ago, in the mid-1980s, I, in my twenties lived in a big Moscow apartment 
with my wife, my very young son, my grandmother Tanya in her mid-80s and her older sister, my grandaunt 
Klara who was almost 90. Klara used to be a technical editor but she worked all her life also as a tailor until 
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almost her death making and adjusting dresses for our big extended family. Once at dinner, when we all met at 
a circle table, Klara asked us why her niece Rosa, who was in her late 60s then, stopped coming to visit. Rosa 
often visited her aunts running errands for them and provided company. I try to reconstruct our conversation 
that my wife and I had with Klara – I combine us together as “we” because neither my wife nor I can remember 
our exact utterances and who made them. I do not remember Tanya verbally participating in the conversation 
but she smiled with irony aligning with my wife and me against her sister, Klara. 
Klara: I wonder why Rosa has stopped showing up at our place.  
We:  We are not surprised. You called her “cow” last time. She was upset.  We think she 
probably still feels being offended by you. 
Klara:  Why would she become offended with me? She brought a new dress and asked my 
opinion. I told her my honest opinion that is that in this dress she looked like a cow. You 
know that I like to tell “mama-truth” in people’s face. It’s not my fault that she looked like a 
cow in this dress. 
We: You hurt her feelings. You didn’t need to lie to Rosa but you could deliver your truth to 
Rosa in more soothing and nice way. For example, you could have said something like 
that, “It seems to me that this dress makes you look a bit chubby, no?” 
Klara:  That would have been a lie. It did not “seem” to me but I saw it in my own eyes that she 
looked like a cow in it. Not “a bit” and not “chubby”, but as a cow! Somebody must tell that 
to her. 
We: Klara, she wanted to hear a word of encouragement from you, not your offending “mama-
truth”. 
Klara:  Truth can’t be offending. “Don’t blame the mirror if your face is ugly!” If Rosa had wanted to 
hear a complement, she should have gone to men-suitors – not to me. 
We: But admit, Klara, you don’t like truth about yourself when it’s unpleasant. 
Klara:  I always love the truth whatever it is. I always like when people tell me the truth even when 
it is bitter. 
We:  Do you? What about when people say that you are rude and insensitive? 
Klara: I don’t like it because that simply is not true.  
So, is it an example of ontological dialogue? Not, by itself, until it starts to be puzzling and 
interesting to you, reader. It puzzles and interests me. I wonder if Klara’s logic is based on some kind of 
logical fallacy that grants her right to tell unpleasant “mama-truth” to others while rejecting this right when 
“mama-truth” is presented by others to herself. Or her logic is OK, – it is consistent and correct, but logic, 
itself, is not omnipotent in humans’ affairs.  I wonder if Klara would agree that truth can’t be rude and 
insensitive, that rudeness is based on meanness while insensitivity is based on wrong perception. With 
Rosa, as with many other people, Klara was not mean-spirited but rather sincere and useful to Rosa 
(remember Gricean maxims of good communication: be truthful, be informative, be relevant, and be 
clear?) (Grice, 1975). Arguably, Klara fulfilled all of these maxims in communication with Rosa, but we, — 
my wife, my grandma, and I, — argued that it was not enough. Of course, Klara’s observational judgment 
that Rosa looked like a cow in the new dress could have been wrong, but we did not challenge Klara’s 
professional fashion judgment – we agreed with Klara that the new dress did not suit Rosa well.  My wife 
and I were concerned not with truth of whether or not the new dress really suited Rosa (not with whether 
or not grandma’s soup is salty, using another example), but with something else altogether that may (or 
may not) be equally or even more important than concerns about truth in a given moment and 
circumstances. Besides truth, one can be concerned about psychological well-being of another person, 
as it is in the case of Klara, or about being appreciative of another labor as in a case of grandma’s over-
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salted soup. Of course, the concern about truth can overweight these non-truth concerns. At least, this 
‘something else’ has to be taken into account when a person provides a response. However, it is 
interesting for me in this example that my wife and I chose Klara’s own way of delivering “mama-truth” to 
communicate to her about the limitations of this way of relating with people. We were telling Klara our 
bitter “mama-truth” in her face about possible reasons of why Rosa stopped visiting us. Not only did Klara 
use her logical closed-circuit to response to us, we used our logical closed-circuit to address her and 
show the limitations of using closed-circuit. The difference was that she believed in using logical closed-
circuit but we did not. Was it our hypocrisy? Can issues of responsibility be talked through using logic? 
Could we defeat Klara using her own weapon? Using Audre Lorde’s (1984) famous phrase, “Can 
master’s tool to be used to dismantle the master’s house?” Lorde thought it can’t but Lisa Delpit (1995) 
thinks it can. Could we present our objections to Klara in a different way without using her telling-mama-
truth-to-your-face logical way? If so, what might it be? Should teachers tell their students mama-truth 
about their deficits in their face? Why? Why not? What are alternatives? Finally (for now), does 
presentation of truth affect the truth itself?  
My reader, if my excerpt, or I, managed to engage you in wonders and considering interesting 
issues that you want to address to me, Klara, my wife, silent Tanya, Grice, Lorde, Delpit, and other 
people that I did not mentioned above, my example of ontological dialogue has been successful, but if 
not, than, sorry, it was not successful. As a successful example, ontological dialogue does not exist 
without your, reader's, engagement becoming interested in this story and its discussion and wanting to 
respond to it. I used my case because I thought it would be easier to engage you in a puzzlement (but I 
could be wrong – if so, sorry). However, sociolinguists (and Bakhtin) used very mundane, almost dull, 
trivial examples to discuss and analyze ontological dialogue (see, for example, Linell, 1998). See the 
following examples from Bakhtin, 
…In the ordinary speech of our everyday life such a use of another's words is extremely widespread, 
especially in dialogue, where one speaker very often literally repeats the statement of the other speaker, 
investing it with new value and accenting it in his own way—with expressions of doubt, indignation, irony, 
mockery, ridicule, and the like (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 194). 
The embedding of words and especially of accents from the other's rejoinder in Makar Devushkin's 
speech is even more marked and obvious in the second of the quoted passages. The words containing the 
other's polemically exaggerated accent are even enclosed here in quotation marks: "He's a copying clerk . . ." In 
the preceding lines the word "copy" is repeated three times. In each of these three instances the other's 
potential accent is present in the word "copy," but it is suppressed by Devushkin's own accent; however, it 
becomes constantly stronger, until it finally breaks through and assumes the form of the other's direct speech. 
We are presented here, therefore, with gradations of gradual intensification in the other's accent: "I know very 
well, of course, that I don't do much by copying . . . [then follows a reservation—M. B.] Why, what if I am a 
copying clerk, after all? What harm is there in copying, after all? 'He's a COPYING clerk!' . . ." We have 
indicated by italics and underscoring the other's accent and its gradual intensification, which finally dominates 
utterly the line of discourse enclosed in quotation marks. But even in these final words, obviously belonging to 
the other, Devushkin's own voice is present too, for he polemically exaggerates the other's accent. As the other 
person's accent intensifies, so does Devushkin's counter-accent (Bakhtin, 1999, pp. 208-209). 
 The notion of ontological dialogue reminds me of a quantum particle that is both localized 
and distributed. Ontological dialogue is localized in the events – it is always here-and-now (like a particle). 
Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy  
Eugene Matusov, Kiyotaka Miyazaki  
 
 
 
 
Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http:dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2014.121  |  Vol. 2 (2014) 
 
SI:ddp-16 
But it is also distributed in time and space – it does not have a beginning or end (like a wave).  It does not 
have cause or genesis, 
Another important feature of the [ontological – EM] dialogue is this it knows neither genesis nor 
causality. Dostoevsky, writes Bakhtin, did not use such a fundamental German classical philosophy category as 
becoming or evolution. For him, the central philosophical categories were such notions as coexistence and 
interaction (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 28). Drawing from Dostoevsky, Bakhtin questioned the relevance of dialectics 
when it comes to a finalizing synthesis of contradictions and differences. This was not a particularly safe thing to 
do in a thoroughly Marxist and therefore "dialectic" country. For Bakhtin, differences never fully merge, instead, 
they coexist in an engaged interaction. Dostoevsky, an embodiment of dialogical thinking for Bakhtin, saw 
everything as coexisting in one single moment. He could only understand the world as coexistence of different 
things. This does not mean that Bakhtin denied the importance of change. What he rejected was the ideas of 
genesis, where the past determines the present. He also rejected the reduction of difference (synthesis) as the 
end of development. Dialogue does not reduce plurality of human worlds and yet it connects various parts of 
this plurality (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 18).  
Studying and revealing ontological dialogue means to engage in it and change it. It cannot remain 
the same, it is always contaminated by new understanding that the researcher brings, by the researcher 
addressing and replying to its participants since, a case of ontological dialogue is in the researcher’s 
response provoked by the presented case and its participants. Inter-observational consensus is not a 
proxy of the validity of interpretation anymore as in traditional research is. An interpretation is validated 
through its testing and depth, – i.e., through internally persuasive discourse involving agreements, 
disagreements and changing topics. Ontological dialogue requires very different orientation from 
traditional social research. It is dialogic subject-oriented and voiced, rather than silent, voiceless object- 
oriented (Bakhtin, 1986). 
 
 
Kiyo Miyazaki’s response to Eugene Matusov’s arguments on ontological, 
epistemological, and instrumental dialogic pedagogy 
(by Kiyotaka Miyazaki) 
From here, I will describe my responses to Eugene’s arguments on ontological, epistemological, 
and instrumental dialogic pedagogy. Eugene’s arguments are divided into two issues. One is about the 
opposition between instrumental dialogic pedagogy and ontological dialogic pedagogy, and the other is 
about the opposition between ontological dialogic pedagogy and epistemological dialogic pedagogy. 
However, I cannot respond to these two issues separately because I cannot agree with Eugene’s 
distinction between the three types of dialogic pedagogies as mutually exclusive categories in the first 
place. So, I will start my response by sharing my perspective on ontological, epistemological and 
instrumental dialogue. First, I will show my view on the relationship between “ontological” and 
“epistemological.” Then, I will comment on Eugene’s critique of his so-called epistemological dialogical 
pedagogy. Finally, I will argue my view on the instrumentality of the dialogic pedagogy and comment on 
his critique of his instrumental pedagogy. 
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Kiyo’s  v iew on “ontolog i ca l”,  “epis temologi cal” and “instrumental” 
Ternary relationship 
Eugene treats these three as mutually exclusive categories. I see these three as three aspects of 
a relation among people. The relation among people can be either dialogic or monologic. More precisely, 
dialogic and monologic are two poles of a continuum and a persons’ relation can be one in between 
dialogic and monologic. Furthermore, a relation between persons is not just a relation between persons at 
its two poles. The relation between persons should be understood as a three-term relation or ternary 
relation. The third term is the world that surrounds the people. A person (or a party) at each pole of a 
relation not only has a relation to each other, but a unique relation to the world.  
Let me describe the ternary relation in detail. Regardless of whether it is dialogic or monologic, 
any relation between person A and B is a relation between A’s relation to the world and B’s relation to the 
world. People do not exist in a vacuum. A person’s experience means that she/he works on, and is 
worked on, by the surrounding world. Some objects are shared between two people. Some objects are 
not. When two people share nothing in the surrounding world, there is no relation between the two 
people. Even when two people share a part of the surrounding world, there is a possibility in which these 
two people have a different relationship to that part. Loving. Hating. Fighting with. Ignoring. Cheating. 
Working together. Teaching. Being taught. Discussing. Any relation is a ternary relation. Even with love, 
that makes a person blind, there is a world surrounding the two people in love, as the third term. A person 
falls in love with the other, attracted by his/her attitude and actions toward the world. Two people who are 
in love are sharing with not only each other, but also the surrounding world. 
Developmental psychologists emphasize the importance of the ternary relationship among a 
child, a caretaker, and objects in the world. An example of this is the development of representation in 
early childhood. One area of research is about the secondary intersubjectivity. Trevarthen and others are 
studying the developmental change of an infant’s awareness of self and others, which they call the shift to 
the secondary intersubjectivity (e.g.,Treverthen & Hubley, 1978).  This developmental level is defined as 
an infant’s coordination and sharing with adults his/her attentions, feelings and intentions toward a third 
pole of an object, event, and action (Fogel & DeKoeyer-Laros, 2007). The importance of the joint-
attention is also shown in other areas of child development like language acquisition (Scaife & Bruner, 
1975). 
I do not know whether Bakhtin or other researchers of dialogue explicitly analyze the dialogic 
relation as ternary one. There is a third term of the world in relation to two people or two camps 
regardless of whether it is a dialogic or a monologic. Three relations in a ternary relationship will change 
together. Depending on whether the relation between two persons is dialogic or monologic, the remaining 
two relations will take a different form. When a relation between two people is monologic and one person 
controls the other, the controller’s view of the surrounding world is pressed on the controlled. In other 
words, the epistemological relation between the controlling person and the surrounding world dominates 
over the relation between the controlled person and the surrounding world. Bakhtin’s description about 
Tolstoy’s novel as a monologic one, cited below (Bakhtin, 1999) can be read as the description of the 
world surrounding the author and heroes as the third term of the ternary relationship.  
That external world in which the characters of the story live and die is the author’s world, an objective 
world vis-à-vis the consciousnesses of the characters. Everything within it is seen and portrayed in the author’s 
all-encompassing and omniscient field of vision (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 71). 
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In a monologic novel, the author’s view of the world dominates. The Author decides how the 
heroes see the world.  On the other hand, Bakhtin characterizes Dostoevsky’s novel as a dialogic one:  
He (Dostoevsky) would have introduced the life and death of the coachman and the tree into the field 
of vision and consciousness of the noblewoman, and the noblewoman’s life into the field of vision and 
consciousness of the coachman. He would have forced his characters to see and know all those essential 
things that he himself - the author - sees and knows. He would not have retained for himself any essential 
authorial “surplus” (essential, that is, from the point of view of the desired truth). He would have arranged a 
face-to-face confrontation between the truth of the nobleman and the truth of the coachman, and he would have 
forced them to come into dialogic contact [omitted,] and he would himself have assumed, in relation to them, a 
dialogic position with equal right (Bakhtin, 1999, p.72). 
A dialogic author does not have a monopoly on the worldview. Her/his worldview shares equal right with 
the hero’s worldview. Each participant can enjoy his or her own worldview.  
The way in which the participants share the world, as the third pole, is the deciding factor about 
the extent to which the people’s relationship can be characterized as dialogic.  This must be the central 
issue for the study of dialogic pedagogy and the dialogue in general. 
Relation between ontology and epistemology 
Ontology, epistemology and instrumentality are three aspects, or characteristics of the ternary 
relationship between two people and the world. Instrumentality has a little bit different of a characteristic 
than the other two, since this characteristic emerges when someone intentionally uses the ternary 
relationship to achieve some purpose. So, I will first discuss the ontological and epistemological aspects 
of the ternary relationship and comment on the instrumental aspect later. My view is that the ontological 
and epistemological aspects always coexist and relate closely in the ternary relationship4 regardless of 
whether it is dialogic or monologic.  
I will first characterize what “ontological” and “epistemological” mean. According to Oxford 
Dictionary of English, “ontology” is “the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being.” Human 
being as an animal is not a static being but an animate being. She/he is always working on other people 
and the surrounding world. So, the ontological aspect of the ternary relationship refers to ways a person 
works on the other person(s) and the surrounding world. The epistemological aspect, on the other hand, 
refers to ways a person is aware of the other person(s) and the surrounding world. 
I use the term “being aware of”, or “awareness” in the sense of the founder of the ecological 
psychology James J. Gibson (1979). Not only human beings, but also animals, are aware of the 
environment. “Being aware of” implies not only conscious knowing but also unconscious knowing. 
Embodied feeling is an important part of this knowing. Eugene’s view on epistemology is too narrow, from 
my standpoint.  He argues in the section of “Epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy” in the 
following way, 
                                                       
4 Someone might argue that there is the four - part relationship between a leaner, a teacher, a learner’s view on the world and a 
teacher’s view on the world in place of the ternary relationship. I do not take this view, because, first, there are not only 
epistemological relations but also ontological relations. So, relations are between people and the world, not between people and 
views on the world. Second, two people share the world and have different views on the shared world. Without sharing the world, 
there is no relation between people, either monologic or dialogic.  
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The Modernist Rational mind has to subordinate to the Iron Logic of the Universal Necessity and 
purify itself from any other irrational and corrupting influences like emotions, values, beliefs, responsibility, 
traditions, social justice, loyalties, vanities, reputations, and judgments (Matusov, 2014). 
Here, Eugene identifies epistemological work as a purified rational reasoning process that follows 
the logical necessity. This definition is too narrow. Human being s’ epistemological work, similar to 
environmental awareness, includes other work such as the embodied sensing and illogical feeling. Even 
emotion has an epistemological component. Frijda (1986) who defines emotion as “a change in action 
readiness,” points out that emotion has an experiential aspect that is “an awareness of some mode of 
action readiness of a passive and action-control-demanding nature, involving readiness to change or 
maintain relationships with the environment (or intentional objects generally.)” Not only emotion. 
Aesthetics is a human being’s awareness of her/his environment’s beauty. All human endeavors Eugene 
listed above as non-intellectual ones have epistemological aspects, if not a rational one. 
Human beings’ epistemological functions can be divided into “purified rational reasoning” and 
other ones. However, a “purified rational reasoning” cannot work alone in human being s’ epistemological 
activities.  To understand something deeply, one should connect a purified rational reasoning about 
something with other types of reasoning.  For example, embodied reasoning and aesthetic reasoning. 
This is particularly important in children’s learning in education, a point I will argue for later. 
Working or acting as an ontological aspect and being aware of the epistemological aspect are 
closely connected and influence each other in the ternary relationship between two people and their 
surrounding world. Gibsonian perception researchers emphasize the importance of this connection. 
Gibsoninan researchers name this connection “perception-action coupling”, “perception-action loop 
(Clark, 1997)”, or “perception-action cycle (Neisser, 1978)”. Gibson’s following phrase shows the basic 
idea, “We must perceive in order to move, but we must also move in order to perceive” (Gibson, 1979, 
p.223). 
Some researchers name the action referred to in the last half of the above phrase as “epistemic 
action” compared to “pragmatic action” (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). Human beings, even some animals, do 
not always only act for the pragmatic purpose of “here and now”. They sometimes act just for the 
epistemic purpose. Reed (1996) states as follows, “Although perception may well have evolved, at least 
in part, directly in the service of guiding activity, as any animal’s perceptual systems get more 
sophisticated, the animal can come to be aware of affordances other than those it is acting upon here and 
now” (p.98). 
I cannot agree with Eugene’s claim that ontology has priority over epistemology. However, his 
assertion is certainly correct in one sense. As Reed argues (1996), animals acquire epistemological 
organ in evolution since they act. Animals must know the world in order to act in it. Still, this is one side of 
a coin. Animals must act in order to know. Sometimes, they act just to know the world. Epistemology does 
not subordinate fully to ontology. 
Researches of Gibsonian scholars are almost limited to perception. Still, the idea of “perception-
action loop” can be expanded to the epistemological functions, other than just perception. Eugene’s so-
called “purified rational reasoning” has developed in evolution (and in cultural development) in order for 
human beings to act in the world. It also depends on action to work if not directly as the researchers of 
embodied cognition argue (e.g., Johnson, 1987). Though it is apparently “pure” and detached from 
everyday life, it cannot be completely off-line from the practical life of a human being. 
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Dialogic and monologic 
Ternary relationship between two persons and the surrounding world can be dialogic or 
monologic. These two should be seen as two poles of one continuum and not as mutually exclusive 
categories.  
A ternary relationship is dialogic when two persons experience “unfinalizability” in the sense of 
Bakhtin. Bakhtin described the relationship between polyphonic novel’s author and its heroes as follows. 
The consciousness of the creator of a polyphonic novel is constantly and everywhere present in the 
novel, and is active in it to the highest degree. But the function of this consciousness and the forms of its activity 
are different than in the monologic novel: the author’s consciousness does not transform others’ 
consciousnesses (that is, the consciousness of the characters) into objects, and does not give them 
secondhand and finalizing definitions. [Omitted] It reflects and re-creates not a world of objects, but precisely 
these other consciousnesses with their worlds, re-creates them in their authentic unfinalizability (which is, after 
all, their essence) (Bakhtin, 1999, p.67-68). 
On the monologic relationship, Bakhtin says as follows, “In a monologic design, the hero is closed 
and his semantic boundaries strictly defined: he acts, experiences, thinks, and is conscious within the 
limits of what he is, that is, within the limits of his image defined as reality [omitted.]” (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 
52). 
When two persons participate in dialogic relation, they continuously generate actions with new 
significance toward themselves, each other, and the surrounding world. This is the ontological aspect of 
the dialogic relation. They also continuously generate new awareness about themselves, each other and 
the surrounding world. This is the epistemological aspect of the dialogic relation. 
When two people are in a monologic relation, they do not generate actions with new significance 
toward themselves, each other, or the surrounding world. Each, or both, participants fix the significance of 
their actions. Their awareness toward themselves, each other, and the surrounding world are also fixed. 
In consequence, there remains only one view dominant in the monologic relation.  
I agree with Eugene to think that unfinalizability distinguishes the dialogic from monologic relation. 
However, Eugene thinks that it is the distinctive characteristic of “Ontological dialogic pedagogy.” For me, 
who thinks that “ontological” is an aspect of the relation that can be dialogic or monologic, unfinalizability 
is the distinctive characteristic of “dialogic pedagogy.” Since unfinalizability is the distinctive characteristic, 
the form of the relation is not relevant for the distinction between dialogic or monologic. Classroom based 
relations in the form of discussion or debate, do not assure that the class is dialogic. In the debate class 
for example, the focus tends to be to win or lose rather than to generate new questions (Tumposky, 
2004). Such a class is monologic in the sense that only one voice dominates. I agree with Eugene that 
lecture class can be dialogic. He says that lecture can be dialogic when it is a long answer to students’ 
questions. Though I do not deny this, I also think that lecture can be dialogic when it generates questions 
in students. 
Eugene’s  two character izat ion o f  dialog i c  pedagogy (onto log i cal  and epis temologi ca l )  v iewed 
from my standpoint 
So far, I have shared my view about epistemology and ontology as two aspects of the dialogic 
and monologic relations. Now I will examine Eugene’s two types of dialogic pedagogy: ontological 
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pedagogy and epistemological pedagogy. Though Eugene further divides epistemological pedagogy into 
instrumental and non-instrumental categories, I do not distinguish these two here. 
What are Eugene’s two types of pedagogy? He wrote as follows, “The epistemological non-
instrumental dialogic pedagogy prioritizes the intellectual sublime of the high culture.” The keyword is 
“high culture” and he contrasts “high culture” with “mundane”. Two terms are not clearly defined by 
Eugene. But his characterization of Bibler’s “School of the Dialogue of Cultures” as “the school of the 
dialogue of high cultures” suggests that he defines the term “high culture” as the contents of school 
subjects like sciences, arts, literatures, and so on. The term “mundane” probably refers to everyday life 
other than schools. These two terms can probably be characterized by the difference in the detachedness 
from the real world of practice. What Eugene names as “epistemological dialogue,” is dialogue in the 
world of ideas detached from the real world of practice.  What Eugene names as “ontological dialogue,” is 
dialogue within the real world of practice.  If education is the intellectual activities in schools, and 
pedagogy is the method to organize these activities, dialogic pedagogy becomes necessarily identical to 
the epistemological dialogic pedagogy in this theoretical framework. 
A different picture is seen from my standpoint. There is an epistemological aspect in what Eugene 
names the ontological dialogic relation, or the dialogic relation in the real world of practice. Real world 
practice forms, and is led by, the epistemological function of the participants. The epistemological 
function, within the real world of practice, may not be a purified rational reasoning but embodied ones like 
an emotional feeling. Still, these are epistemological functions and lead the everyday practice. However, 
epistemological aspects of the everyday practice has a unique characteristic. Most everyday practices do 
not aim for the achievement of the epistemological concern. These activities aim for the achievement of 
the practical concern of the participants like their desire, demands, and interests. Epistemological function 
is just a means for achieving practical concerns. 
Similarly, there is an ontological aspect in what Eugene names the epistemological dialogic 
relation, or the dialogic relation in the world of ideas from my standpoint. As I already noted, even the 
purified intellectual function depends on actions that some researchers call “epistemic action.” This action 
connotes not only the ideal action but also embodied action. As far as the epistemological dialogic 
relation has a component of action, it has an ontological aspect. It also has some attributes generally 
attached to action like desires and emotions. Intellectual curiosity is one of them. Ontologically, 
participants in this relation can be named as “intellectual inquirer.” 
About Eugene’s  cr i t ique on the epis temologi cal  dialogue 
I will examine Eugene’s two characterizations, or critiques, about his so called “epistemological 
dialogic pedagogy.” First, he argues that epistemological dialogue does not involve an ontological 
meeting of the participants. As noted above, I think that Eugene’s use of the term “ontological” refers to 
participants’ life activities and various relations among them in the so-called real world outside of schools. 
Eugene’s use of the term “epistemological” refers to participants’ life activities and various relations 
among them in the world of ideas. So, his first characterization is the logical consequence from his views 
on two types of relations. However, is it possible to disconnect the activity in the real world from the 
activity in the world of ideas?  
It should be emphasized that the activity in the world of idea is a necessary one for human 
beings. Even animals, other than human being have its precursor as Gibsonian scholars argue. Though 
such epistemic action is temporarily detached from the various kinds of mundane interests and desires, it 
is eventually used for expanding human being’s action in the real world. 
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Gibsonian scholars are not the only ones who argue the necessity of the epistemic activity in the 
world of ideas for expanding the activity in the real world. Wartofsky (1979) argues that there are three 
types of artifacts and it is the third type, which he named the tertiary artifact that is used in the activity in 
the world of ideas. Epistemic activities, using the tertiary artifact, are contemplation and/or aesthetic or 
disinterested perception. However, such epistemic activities are not fully detached from the real world 
practice.  
If, as I claim, an ‘actual’ world is social-historical praxis, (technology, social organization, etc.), then 
the ‘possible’ worlds provide candidates for conceivable change in this mode of praxis itself. The perceptual 
alternative provides the possibility of a practical alternative, as, so to speak, a perceptual hypothesis 
(Wartofsky, 1979, p. 209). 
The epistemic activity can expand the possibilities of activities in the real world indirectly as it is 
once detached from the real world activity and specializes in exploring the ‘possible worlds.’ 
The epistemic activity is not an escape from the real world. It is the activity with which animals 
and human beings necessarily have to widen the possibilities in the real world life. So, the epistemic 
activity is vital for school education. As Cole (1997) pointed out, school can be the tertiary artifact in which 
children can experience various kinds of possibilities for their future real world life. 
Eugene’s epistemological dialogue not only has indirect relation to his ontological dialogue as I 
noted above but also has its own ontological aspect since his epistemological dialogue is the activity of 
the epistemological being from my standpoint. In other words, it has its own “ontological concern.” 
Intellectual curiosity, as intrinsic motivation, is a typical one. Eugene says that he does not know how 
participants’ interests to the problem developed in Lakatos’ imaginary math classroom. He says he does 
not know how their interests are grounded in participants’ real lives. I think that problems in the classroom 
need not be grounded in participants’ real lives. What is important is if the problems in the classroom can 
stimulate the intellectual curiosity of the participants’ as epistemological beings. And the pedagogy’s 
important missions are to characterize such problems and to find out ways for generating such problems. 
Eugene’s second characterization or critique of his so-called epistemological dialogic pedagogy is 
that it prioritizes the high culture and is interested in the mundane only because it can give the material 
and opportunity to move to the sublime. It is true that learning objectives of school education are mostly 
taken from high culture. The failure of his argument is his disregard for the importance of high culture for 
people to understand the significance of their mundane experience. In people’s lives, the high culture and 
the mundane experience are intrinsically connected. Not only can people’s understandings be enriched 
by their deep understanding of a mundane experience. The reverse is also true. Understanding high 
culture helps people to explore the significance of their mundane experience, which is hidden from them 
in everyday life. Appreciating the high culture like sciences, arts, and literature is not the leisure of the 
elite. The high culture is the historical product to make explicit the significance of the mundane 
experience motivated by Eugene’s so-called ontological concern. It has been produced by the abstraction 
of some kind of universality from the mundane, corporal experience. The lesson in the classroom can 
provide children a chance to learn the intrinsic relations between the high culture and the mundane 
experience. 
Let me introduce one case to show the importance of connecting the mundane experience and 
the understanding of high culture in the classroom. It is an episode of a teacher’s understanding of a 
poem. The teacher studied the poem as a preparation for a lesson. This type of learning is called 
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Kyouzai-Kaishaku or “interpreting a teaching material” in Japan (Saitou,1964; Miyazaki, 2010).  The 
poem’s title is “Haru” or “Spring,” written by Fuyue Anzai (1898 - 1965).  
Haru (Spring) 
Chouchou ga ippiki Dattan kaikyou wo watatte itta. 
(A butterfly has gone alone over the Dattan strait) 
Dattan strait is now called Mamiya strait and is between the Asian continent and Saklin islands, 
which belonged to Japan before the WW2. A more important fact is that the word “Dattan” sounds very 
heavy or solemn to the Japanese, and the sound reminds us something challenging and difficult to 
overcome, though most Japanese do not know its meaning. The poem can be, and is generally 
interpreted, to describe a little being like a butterfly challenging the difficulties such as flying over the 
strait. 
The poem was published in 1929 and was avant-garde in its day. It is a typical “high culture” 
learning material. Yukio Tsukamoto, a principal of a Japanese elementary school and my collaborator in 
developing dialogic pedagogy, once had a lesson on this poem for 6th graders. He conducted Kyouzai-
Kaishaku for the preparation of the lesson. He tried to understand this poem by connecting this “high 
culture” product with the mundane, real life episodes of his friends. So, his is a good case to analyze the 
relation between high culture and the mundane experience. 
The poem is sometimes used as learning material in Japanese elementary schools. There have 
been many studies accumulated by teachers about this poem like the analysis of its linguistic structure or 
the analysis of its variants. These are ”the high culture type” analyses of the poem as the high culture. 
These analyses are themselves not worthless and Tsukamoto learned about some of them. However, he 
turned his attention to the seemingly unrelated, real life episodes of his friends. In reading the poem, he 
was reminded of his friends’ real life episodes, such as retirement, changing jobs, and falling in love, and 
connected these episodes to the world of the poem. 
Some comments will be necessary to help Western readers understand the following. Spring, the 
title of the poem, has some connotation for us Japanese. Since the end of March and the beginning of 
April marks both the beginning and end of the school year and fiscal year for companies and the 
government, spring is the season for the Japanese to leave old communities for their new lives.  
In the following, I will share an episode Tsukamoto referred to in the letter he sent to his fellow 
teachers to tell them about his view of the poem. He introduced his friend Tsukushi (pseudonym in this 
paper. Names of another teacher and the elementary school are pseudonym too), a teacher, as follows, 
There have been many happenings in these March and April. Most shocking among them was my 
friend Tsukushi’s retirement after 29 years long career as a teacher. His family said to him that he had worked 
enough and his brother living in his hometown said that he had done his best, he told to me. He said there have 
been many happenings in these 29 years and he had never wavered in his decision to quit the job and had 
worked cheerfully with his colleagues in the last weeks. So, some colleagues had been surprised with the 
announcement of his retirement at the last teacher meeting. 
In Tsukushi’s letter, Tukamoto quoted, Tsukushi recorded his final day in school as follows, 
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At the last meeting, names of retirees of the year were announced. Mr. Iguchi, whose desk was next 
to mine, said, “ Why didn’t you tell me earlier? You have been always telling me everything honestly, haven’t 
you? Why do you quit?” 
“I am tired. There have been many happenings. Now I want to rest.” 
“What did your wife say?” 
“She did not oppose to my decision. She said, not to make her feel more painful.” 
“How about your living?” 
“Income will decrease so living will be harder. In the next year, all the children will leave home and be 
independent of us. I had worked hard for children.  Now I do not hesitate to quit.” 
He said goodbye to the children of the class as follows, 
Today, I leave the school. In 3 years I have been with you, I have been experiencing a lot. I want to 
tell you this most. In your life from now, you would feel tough, feel hard and feel sad. You can rely on other 
people at these moments. Rely on friends, teachers and families. It does not mean you are weak. It is not a 
shame for you to rely on other people at these moments. Everyone has lived and will live in that way. I love this 
town. I love all people in Yamada elementary school. 
Tsukamoto commented on Tsukuba’s speech to children as follows. 
Only a person who has felt sad, felt the tender-heartedness of others and the importance of others, 
and had changed himself in his life can deliver this speech. I just want you to know how Mr. Tsukushi behaved 
in his retirement. 
Though Tsukamoto noted his interpretation of the poem, I will omit it. What is important here is 
not the content of his interpretation of the poem but the fact that he tried to interpret the poem by 
connecting the poem with the seemingly irrelevant real life experiences of the people. Why did he do this?  
For Tsukamoto, his friend’s experience shown in this episode was not irrelevant to the poem. His 
friend decided to go forth to the unknown future after the long agony he experienced as a teacher. For 
Tsukamoto, this situation of his friend overlapped with the situation the butterfly experienced in the poem.  
On the one hand, Tsukamoto understood the world of the poem by connecting with it the real life 
experience of the people. Tsukamoto made clear the significance of his friend’s experience through 
reading this poem. Many people would read poems and novels in similar fashion by connecting them with 
people’s real life experiences. This reading is effective because the high culture like poems and people’s 
mundane experiences are closely tied.  The high culture, like poems, attracts people because these shed 
light on the significance hidden in the mundane experience of the people. Mundane experience is not just 
a material to understand the high culture. 
Instrumental  dialog i cal  pedagogy  
Let us turn now to the issue of instrumentality. As noted before, I do not adopt the category 
“instrumental pedagogy” as distinct from other types of pedagogies. Instrumentality is a feature of any 
relationship regardless of whether it is dialogic or monologic. Since the pedagogical activities are not 
natural phenomena, but are generated intentionally by human beings for some purposes, they are more 
or less instrumental. It is so even in the case that people’s purpose is to experience the dialogic relation 
itself. 
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Then, how about Eugene’s so-called instrumental dialogical pedagogy? He characterized it as the 
one that “services an effective means for non-dialogic ends”(Italic is mine). If his characterization is 
correct, this one should be named not “instrumental dialogic pedagogy” but “monologic pedagogy.” 
Maybe, what he calls “instrumental dialogical pedagogy” uses instructional methods like discussion and 
debates. But, as Eugene himself says, and I have already noted, whether these methods are used or not 
is irrelevant when defining them as dialogic. Regardless of the instructional methods they use, the 
pedagogies should be called “monologic” when they serve teachers’ preset “one correct end.”  
The defining characteristic of a monologic lesson is the teacher’s act of presetting an endpoint. 
Still, whether the endpoint is preset at the start of the lesson or not, is not the discriminating characteristic 
between a monologic lesson and a dialogic lesson. Dialogic lesson needs some preset endpoint (most 
often set by teachers). What makes this lesson dialogic, but not monologic, is that, the first, preset 
endpoint is not an answer but a question. For a lesson to be dialogic, there should be a genuine question 
at the beginning. That question ignites the inquiry process in the class and makes the lesson dialogic. 
The question should not be the so-called known-information-question that the teacher knows the answer, 
but the one I call the unknown-information-seeking-question5 where the teacher does not know the 
answer before the class (Miyazaki, 2011). 
The second characteristic of a dialogic lesson is that the question changes throughout the lesson. 
In other words, both students and teacher, through their dialogue, discover new questions or new 
implications of the first question throughout the lesson. Dialogic questioning unfinalizes itself and the 
inquiry. This is the real hallmark of a dialogic lesson. 
Let me show you one episode from Tsukamoto’s class lesson about the previously referred to 
poem. Since the poem was written in the 1920s, the notations of the characters for “chouchou” or butterfly 
are different from the ones used now. Children, even many adults, cannot read the notations used in the 
poem as “chou-chou,” butterfly in Japanese. They read them as “te-fu-te-fu” which has no meaning as a 
Japanese word. So, the children did not know that this poem was about the butterfly when the class 
began. Tsukamoto asked children what the word “te-fu-te-fu” meant. This question was a simple, known-
information-question.  
The class divided into three groups regarding their answers. One answer was “a butterfly,” the 
correct one. The other two were fish and bird. Ten children voted for butterfly, eight for fish, and seven for 
bird. The teacher asked why they thought it was a butterfly.  Some of her answers were as follows, 
“Because the same sounds were repeated twice in ‘te-fu-te-fu’ as in the case of ‘chou-chou.’ Because the 
title is “spring” and a butterfly starts flying in spring.” 
The teacher asked the same question again. This time, the answer “butterfly” became the 
majority (19). Nine voted for fish, and three for bird. Teacher asked why some children thought it was a 
fish. One answered as follows, “Because this one had gone over the strait that bird cannot.” 
Following this answer, the teacher gave some explanation about a strait in general and the 
Dattan strait in particular. He said, “A strait is a sea between two places, between an island and a 
continent or between an island and an island. For example, the Tsugaru Strait is between Honshu Island 
and Hokkaidou Island. Mamiya Strait (Dattan Strait) is between Sakhalin Island and the continent.” Then, 
                                                       
5 I named this type of question “the unknown-information-seeking question” in Miyazaki (2011). Recent analysis showed that the 
term “unknown question” is more appropriate than the former one to describe this type of question since it includes not only the 
question in which the teacher does not know the answer but also one in which the teacher does not know either its existence or its 
significance before the class. 
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the teacher again asked the same question and the result was surprising. Children whose answer was 
“butterfly” decreased to six and those who answered “fish” became the majority (more than 20). 
Later, the teacher told the author who had observed this lesson that he had not expected such 
answers and hesitated about what to do in the next step of the lesson. Having the children discuss this 
issue was one possibility. Instead, he decided to give the children the correct answer, since it was still the 
beginning of the class and there remained many issues for the class to tackle. So he told the class, “This 
is not a fish but a butterfly.” But he didn’t stop there. He continued as follows, “Your thoughts are very 
good. Your thought is that a fish can cross the strait, a bird might not be able to, but for a butterfly, it is 
impossible to cross the strait. That thought is very good.” 
The teacher’s response should not be taken as some kind of comfort for children who gave the 
wrong answer. This is an acknowledgement by the teacher that their answer is, in some sense, true. The 
answer “fish” is certainly incorrect as the answer to the question what has gone over the Dattan strait. 
However, when the children answered it was a fish, they must have felt that a fish can cross the strait, but 
a butterfly cannot. They must have felt that the strait is a difficult place for a butterfly. The difficulty of the 
Dattan Strait for the creature certainly pertains to the theme of the poem. The children must have grasped 
the difficulty of the strait intuitively. In the sense that the children correctly grasped this difficulty of the 
strait, their answer that it was a fish was correct. For many children, the teacher’s question was not about 
how the word “te-fe-te-fu” was read, but about what animal can go over such a challenging strait. To this 
new question, the answer “fish” was correct. In children’s apparently wrong answer, the teacher found out 
a new question that the children had generated. The teacher made it clear to the children and shared the 
new question with the children through his comments.  A new question was generated in the inquiry of the 
known-information-question set at the beginning. Though this is a small episode, such a development 
makes the lesson dialogic. The absence of a preset endpoint does not make the lesson dialogic. 
Generation of the new question, in the pursuit of a preset endpoint, makes the lesson dialogic. 
 
Eugene’s reply to Kiyo’s critique 
(by Eugene Matusov) 
Kiyo wrote, “I cannot agree with Eugene’s distinction of three types of dialogic pedagogies as the 
mutually exclusive categories in the first place.” I wonder if there has been some misunderstanding. I 
have never claimed that instrumental, ontological and epistemological pedagogical dialogues are in 
opposition to each other or are mutually exclusive. Kiyo wrote, “I see these three as three aspects of a 
relation among persons.” I agree.  But, maybe, I agree with Kiyo only to a point. 
In my second original essay above, I think I tried to make it clear that any ontological approach 
has an epistemological aspect while any epistemological dialogue has an ontological aspect, although 
there may not be enough to make this point clear as I argue that epistemology subordinates to ontology. 
The matter is rather complicated in my view. For example, Kiyo wrote, “First, he argues that 
epistemological dialogue does not involve an ontological meeting of the participants.” I both accept and 
do not accept Kiyo’s portrayal of my position. I disagree with Kiyo’s portrayal because any dialogue and 
monologue (even an internal monologue in solitude) ALWAYS involves an ontological meeting of the 
participants whether the participants acknowledge/value it or not. However, what I tried to say is that in 
Epistemological Dialogues (both I and II), ontological meeting of the participants is disregarded from 
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pedagogical dialogue or bracketed as an annoyance. It is in this latter sense, I think Kiyo’s portrayal of my 
position is accurate. 
Unfortunately, I did not make the non-exclusive relation as clear for instrumental and ontological 
dialogues, as I should have. Thanks, Kiyo for pointing at that omission in my text above. After Bakhtin, I 
argue that any dialogue (pedagogical or not) has all three aspects (actually many more), namely: 
instrumentality, ontologicity, and epistemologicity. What makes instrumental dialogue instrumental is NOT 
evidence of the presence of instrumentality but rather subordination of ontologicity to instrumentality, 
when dialogue serves for non-dialogic pedagogical (and organizational) purposes, losing interest in and 
respect for dialogic partners who often become either means or objects of pedagogical and/or 
organizational actions. Similarly, what makes epistemological dialogue epistemological is NOT evidence 
of the presence of epistemologicity but rather subordination of ontologicity to epistemologicity. In my view, 
to make a pedagogical dialogue ontological is NOT to purify it from its instrumental and/or epistemological 
aspects – not at all! Instead, it is about focusing on ontologicity as the priority over instrumentality and 
epistemologicity in dialogue while supporting both of these important aspects as needed.  
I do not know if this clarification would satisfy Kiyo or not. I suspect that not completely but I can 
be wrong. My suspicion is based on his conceptualizing “ternary relationship” treating instrumentality, 
ontologicity, and epistemologicity as equal, if not, actually, prioritizing epistemologicity, while I do not. I 
strategically prioritize defining a human being as “being-in-the-world” rather than “knowing-the-world” (i.e., 
epistemological priority) or “serving-some-other-outcomes6” (the instrumental priority).  
I have found Kiyo’s new triangle7– two people and an object – as the unit of analysis of dialogue 
as rather unhelpful. Elsewhere, I (Matusov, 2007b) argue against defining inquiry as “the search for the 
appropriate unit of analysis” since I think that a unit of analysis has to be specific to a particular inquiry 
and material at hand. I think the unit of analysis in a social science or humanity research should not be 
totalizing and comprehensive but rather contextual and authorial. Saying all that, I have found Bakhtin’s 
concept of “utterance” as his totalizing unit of analysis of dialogue more promising (for some particular 
dialogic investigations) than Kiyo’s “ternary relationship” that he may have borrowed from non-dialogic 
tradition of social sciences. I think it a step backward rather than a step forward as his triangle hides more 
than it reveals about the dialogical qualities of human interactions, relations, discourses, and activities 
such as addressivity, responsivility, responsibility, finalizing-unfinalizing, and so on. 
Reading Kiyo’s critique here, and his other work, makes me suspect that he is a proponent of 
what I call “non-instrumental epistemological dialogue” (or the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II). 
Thus, he wrote, -- and I see this statement of a pedagogical belief as the birthmark of Epistemological 
Pedagogical Dialogue II, “Understanding the high culture helps people to explore the significance of their 
mundane experience hidden from them in everyday life.” In my view, sometimes it is true and sometimes 
it is not. Sometimes the exact reverse is true: it is the low culture that can help to understand and ground 
the high culture (see my example of Thomas Jefferson’s hold on mundane slavery above). Even more, I 
insist that understanding of the high culture, which is usually rooted in the past ontology (especially in 
school), can ONLY ACCIDENTALLY and PARTIALLY help “people to explore the significance of their 
mundane experience hidden from them in everyday life.” Yes, the high culture can be relevant and 
inspiring but it’s relevance and inspiration are always limited by the mundane demands of the physical, 
semiotic, relational, emotional, and ethic unique here-and-now. I do not want to disvalue the high culture 
                                                       
6 That is why I oppose to so-called “outcome-based education.” 
7 The other triangles as unit of psychological analysis can be found in Marx, Köhler, Vygotsky, Leont’ev, Engeström (along, 
probably, to many others). I suspect (i.e., hypothesize) that the triangle-like unit of analysis originates in Hegel’s dialectical 
philosophy focusing on mediation but this needs more investigation. 
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but I want to find its limits and elevate the importance of the mundane life that is often disvalued, 
bracketed, and illegitimate in both conventional and many innovative schools.  
As local instructional moves, I have nothing against the instrumental use of low culture as a way 
for teachers to make the study of high culture more relevant, comprehensible, and engaging for students. 
Also, I am not against an instrumental use of the high culture for understanding the low culture. Both 
instructional moves were presented in the movie “Freedom Writers” (DeVito, et al., 2007) dramatizing the 
real events of an innovative teacher at an urban school (Freedom Writers & Gruwell, 1999). In this case, 
a novice English teacher in an urban LA high school (unsuccessfully) tried to use (I’d argue, exploit) the 
students’ poor and violent backgrounds (i.e., the low culture) for teaching Homer’s Odyssey (i.e., the high 
culture). Her instructional move was unsuccessful, as her students recognized, rejected, and resisted the 
exploitation of their home cultures, but it doesn’t always have to be unsuccessful. Later, she rather 
successfully used the history of the Holocaust (i.e., the high culture) for helping the students deeply and 
critically reflect on their own racism and glamorized violent gang culture (i.e., the low culture). In general, I 
see both instructional moves as legitimate under certain pedagogical circumstances. However, what I 
view as problematic is educators’ overwhelming focus on teaching the high culture as the goal of 
education and, thus, pedagogically disvaluing the low culture. I am against excluding low culture from 
study for its own sake in its own material and its own discourse8. 
This credo of the monopoly and superiority of the high culture on reflection is, in my view, what 
catapults the Epistemological Dialogue II in education. I agree with Bakhtin along with Morson and 
Emerson that not only does the low culture provide the material and fertile ground for the high culture but 
at times the low culture (prosaics) can lead, can renew, and be superior to the high culture (poetics) 
(Bakhtin, 1999; Morson & Emerson, 1990). 
In my view, the Aristotelian framework of ways of knowing may help to illuminate the flaws of the 
Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II that Kiyo, among other dialogic educationalists, seems to 
embrace. I found Aristotle’s four types of knowing most useful (Matusov & Brobst, 2013, p. 129): 
Using Aristotle’s (2000) terminology, the ideology of the exact science focuses only on 
technological (i.e., skills detached from the purposes, strategies, techniques of dealing with things 
that can be different from what they are toward a preset outcome) and epistemological (i.e., the 
universal, objective, eternal truth, detached from any human subjectivity, – the truth of the 
necessity) ways of knowing. The ideology of the exact science project, articulated by positivism, 
describes the exact science as poiesis, in which what is considered to be good science must be 
and has been articulated in advance through the valid, self-containing scientific methodology. In 
contrast, the ideology of the humanitarian science also (if not mainly) focuses on phronêsis (i.e., 
practical, situated, participatory, perceived, embodied wisdom of local and unique possibilities – 
the truth of good possibilities) and sophia (i.e., philosophy; inquiries of the ultimate, “final damned 
questions” including existence, virtues, and goodness; examination of the world as a whole) 
(Bakhtin, 1999; Wiliam, 2008).  
The Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II heavily prioritizes the epistemological way of 
knowledge (i.e., epistêmê) with its objective, universal truth and detachment at expense of, especially, 
phronêsis – practical wisdom in loci-- so rich in the mundane life of the low culture (although I argue that 
all four ways of knowing are present in the low culture).  
                                                       
8 This discussion is relevant for developing the concept of “culturally relevant pedagogy” (Ladson-Billings, 1994; Lee, 2006; Morrell, 
2002). 
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1. I charge the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II with the following mutually related flaws: 
2. Prioritization	  of	  knowing-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  (epistêmê)	  over	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  (ontology);	  
3. Prioritization	  of	  epistêmê	  over	  phronêsis	  knowing	  of	  the	  world;	  
4. Prioritization	  of	  the	  high	  culture	  over	  the	  low	  culture;	  
5. Superiority	   of	   the	   schooled	   and,	   especially,	   schooled	   people	   (i.e.,	   cultural	   elite)	   over	  
common	  people	  (snobbism).	  
In sum, I’m not against studying the high culture – as a part of the real life; it can be a part of the 
curricula. Further, I also agree that sometimes studying of the high culture can help people to deal with 
their mundane life, although I respectfully disagree that the value of the high culture is only instrumental. 
Being an important part of human activity (and a cultural artifact), study of the high culture can, and 
arguably should, be for the sake of the high culture itself as any important part of human activity. The high 
culture can become ontological and meaningful for students no less than the low culture. 
However, I respectfully disagree with Kiyo and other proponents of the Epistemological 
Pedagogical Dialogue II, that: 
a) the high culture is intellectually, morally, or humanly superior over the low culture, 
b) the low culture is incapable on its own reflection in its own material and discourse, 
c) the low culture should be avoided, ghettoized in low prestige vocational training,  or bracketed from 
education as valuable curriculum in its own rank,  
d) the low culture has to be exploited for teaching the high culture through so-called “activation of prior 
knowledge” or used purely and exclusively instrumentally as Kiyo put it, “by connecting this ‘high culture’ 
product with the mundane, real life episodes of his friends” or for students’ engagement in the “high 
culture” curricular material (Matusov, von Duyke, & Han, 2012). 
By excluding and/or exploiting the low culture, the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II 
creates “teaching taboos”9 (Ayers & Ayers, 2011) against such important curricular topics, constituting 
the low culture, such as: sex, drugs, pop-culture, violence, vulgarity, profanity, contextualized 
interpersonal ethic problems and conflicts, social and historical injustices taken for granted, current 
societal and political tensions and controversies, current war conflicts, students’ personal interests and 
needs, their ongoing dramas and tragedies, common slurs and prejudices, social and political taboos, 
issues of human ecology, and so on. For example, in the late 1990s and the earlier 2000s, I debated the 
issue with my Russian Epistemologically-minded dialogic colleagues that studying the current mundane, 
controversial, “vulgar”, and messy Russian-Chechen wars was no less, if not, arguably, more important, 
especially for students in the Russian Federation, than the high culture, “noble”, and comprehensible 
Trojan War in the great epics by Homer (Matusov, 2009b). Expectably, some of my Russian colleagues 
from the School of Dialogue of Cultures approach, promoting the Epistemological Pedagogical dialogue, 
disagreed with me. I suspect that establishment and maintenance of the teaching taboos regime, 
promoted by the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II, requires pedagogical violence (Matusov, 
2009a; Sidorkin, 2002). 
I agree with Kiyo’s judgment that instrumental dialogic pedagogy is essentially monologic – it is 
dialogic by its form, but monologic by its essence of promoting monologic relations. Thus, Instrumental 
Pedagogical Dialogue can be characterized as dialogic monologue – dialogic by the form and monologic 
by its essence. However, I think that the term “instrumental dialogic pedagogy” or “instrumental dialogue” 
is useful because 1) dialogic monologue is different from monologic monologue – monologic by the form 
and the essence and 2) these terms help to evaluate certain tendencies of educators who are interested 
in Dialogic Pedagogy. 
                                                       
9  An alternative way of conventional education dealing with the low culture is to de-ontologize it by teaching universal, 
decontextualized concepts like “bullying” or “safe sex” (Smith, 2010, February). 
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Finally, I keep insisting that curricular endpoints preset by the teacher hinder a genuine dialogue 
(but never make a genuine dialogue impossible as a genuine dialogue can occur in any conditions 
however unfavorable). Kiyo wrote, “Dialogic lessons needs some preset endpoint, mostly by teachers. 
What makes this lesson to be dialogic but not monologic is that, first, preset endpoint is not the answer 
but a question.” Of course, a dialogic teacher may prepare some questions — although, I disagree that it 
is required for a dialogic lesson, — open-ended prepared questions are NOT endpoints10, by its very 
definition of being open-ended. Preset curricular endpoints are where students are supposed to arrive 
(always temporary, in my view). When students arrive at endpoints, known to the teacher in advance, as 
it seems to be in the case presented by Kiyo above, it still can be a genuine dialogue between the 
students and the teacher. What makes the difference between essentially monologic and essentially 
dialogic pedagogy is that in the latter case of a genuine dialogue the students’ arrival at the endpoint 
known by the teacher in advance is accidental or occasional and the teacher is open to the students’ (and 
his/her own) arrival at some other endpoint not necessarily known by the teacher in advance. Thus, in a 
genuine dialogue, my interlocutor may occasionally say something that I expect to hear from him or her or 
may arrive at a point that I might expect in advance. I argue that when this happens, these points known 
in advance represent the least interesting moments of a genuine dialogue. I think the difference is in 
presetting versus occasionally knowing the curricular endpoints, at which the students arrive, (and for the 
teacher to be open to know something different and new and to let the students legitimately disagree with 
the teacher and each other). 
  
                                                       
10 Unless their steering the students to some kind of the preset endpoint or block the students’ own inquiries, questions, and 
interests. In these cases, I wonder how much we can call these teacher’s questions genuinely “open-ended.” 
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Part II 
The teacher as the dialogic author 
(by Kiyotaka Miyazaki) 
Now let us turn to the issue of the teacher’s location and role in a dialogic lesson. I believe that 
the teacher is the dialogic author and the student is the dialogic hero in a dialogic lesson. Or instead, I 
should say that teacher is the author and the student is the hero in a lesson regardless of whether it is 
dialogic or monologic, and the student becomes the dialogic hero when the teacher becomes the dialogic 
author so that the lesson becomes dialogic. 
“Co-authorship” is another possibility that characterizes the teacher and students in dialogic 
lessons. In this view, the teacher and student collaboratively generate the dialogic lesson. Though I do 
not deny that the teacher and student work collaboratively in dialogic lessons, I do not adopt this “co-
authorship” point of view. Why? As I argued in the section on instrumentality of dialogue, the classroom, 
as a pedagogical location, is organized intentionally by the teacher for the purpose of promoting student 
learning. It is up to the teacher to create lessons that are either dialogic or monologic. Although students’ 
contributions make the lesson dialogic as they work collaboratively with the teacher in the lesson, the final 
responsibility is the teacher’s. Only when the teacher becomes a dialogic author will the lessons become 
dialogic and the students become dialogic heroes. 
How does the teacher become the dialog i c  author?  
How can the teacher become a dialogic author? According to Morson and Emerson (1990), 
Bakhtin presented two types of methods the dialogic author/teacher uses. First, “he [polyphonic author, 
that is, dialogic author] creates a world in which many disparate points of view enter into dialogue” 
(Morson & Emerson, 1990, p. 239). According to Bakhtin (1999), Dostoevsky utilized the adventure plot 
as the arena for dialogue since such a plot stimulates the dialogue between its heroes: 
In Dostoevsky, the adventure plot is combined with the posing of profound and acute problems 
[omitted]. It places a person in extraordinary positions that expose and provoke him, it connects him and makes 
him collide with other people under unusual and unexpected conditions precisely for the purpose of testing the 
idea and the man of the idea, that is, for testing the “man in man” (p. 105). 
What is important here is not the adventure plot itself but the fact that it presents “profound and	 
acute problems” to the heroes in which they encounter other heroes “under unusual and unexpected 
conditions precisely for the purpose of testing the idea.” 
Second, the dialogic author is as “himself to participate in that dialogue” (Morson & Emerson, 
1990, p. 239).  In particular, listening to heroes is important for one to join in dialogue with the heroes. 
Dostoevsky’s listening as an author characterized by Bakhtin is suggestive: 
Dostoevsky possessed an extraordinary gift for hearing the dialogue of his epoch, or, more precisely, 
for hearing his epoch as a great dialogue, for detecting in it not only individual voices, but precisely and 
predominantly the dialogic relationship among voices, their dialogic interaction. He heard both the loud, 
recognized, reigning voices of the epoch, that is, the reigning dominant ideas (official and unofficial), as well as 
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voices still weak, ideas not yet fully emerged, latent ideas heard as yet by no one but himself, and ideas that 
were just beginning to ripen, embryos of future worldviews. (Italics, original) (p. 90). 
For Dostoevsky, the concept of listening is to listen for the “embryos of future worldview.” 
Listening for him is not just to understand others but also to understand possibilities latent in others. 
Work of  t eacher as the dialog i c  author 
Interestingly enough, there are two types of methods the dialogic teachers developed in the 
Japanese dialogic pedagogical views such as Saitou pedagogy (Miyazaki, 2010, 2011), which correspond 
to two types of methods of Bakhtin’s dialogic author. The first type is the teachers’ creation of “unknown 
question”1 which I cited above. This corresponds to Bakhtin’s first method in which the dialogic author 
“creates a world in which many disparate points of view enter into dialogue.” The second type is the 
teachers’ listening to the students. These two types are not distinguishable exclusively in the actual 
lesson, even though they occasionally overlap and interact. In some instances, the second type (listening) 
requires the first type (asking unknown questions) to work effectively and the first type occurs when the 
teacher commits the second type. 
Unknown questions used in the first type are exactly “the profound and acute problems” Bakhtin 
described above. They place students “in extraordinary positions and provoke” and stimulate them to 
explore the initial questions as well as additional related questions. In addition, unknown questions 
stimulate the teachers to explore questions collaboratively with children. In this sense, creating unknown 
questions not only creates a world of dialogue for the students as heroes but also allows the teacher as 
the author to participate in the dialogue. 
Teacher’s learning of the teaching material for discovering “unknown question” in it is called 
“Kyouzai-kaishaku” or “interpreting teaching material” in Saitou pedagogy as I introduced above. Saitou 
characterized “kyouzai-kaishaku” as follows: 
First of all, a teacher should, as one person, encounter and wholeheartedly confront teaching material 
in all its respects [omitted]. A teacher should, as one person, wholeheartedly interact with the teaching material, 
analyze it, have questions about it, ask oneself, discover and create something new in it. Through these 
endeavors, the teacher can accumulate new questions, new thinking and new logic about the teaching material. 
Only after the teacher has completed such an interpretative work on the teaching material, that is, 
only after she/he has encountered with it, can the lesson have definite direction, intention and explicit, dramatic 
construction. This is because, only after such an encountering, the teacher’s knowledge about the teaching 
material transforms from being a collection of random pieces to a lively one acquired by their significant efforts. 
This is also because, after such an encountering, the teacher can make the children confront with the lively 
knowledge that she/he acquired by being excited by it, by doubting it, and by discovering it afresh (Saitou 1964, 
p. 89 - 90. Originally in Japanese, translated to English by the author). 
It is generally assumed that teaching material used in early education is easy to understand and 
not worth the effort to tackle with all of one’s intellectual strength. However, Saitou pedagogy does not 
agree with this approach since it believes that a teacher can discover new, exciting questions within the 
apparently easy teaching material. To do so, the teacher has to challenge it with all of the intellectual 
strength she/he has as an adult. 
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Now let me discuss the second type of the dialogic teacher’s work: to participate herself/himself in 
dialogue, particularly by listening to students. The importance of listening to students is oftentimes 
emphasized by many pedagogical thoughts such as, Reggio Emilia (Vecchi, 2010). However, the nature 
of teacher’s listening to students has not been fully understood. In the dialogic classroom, the teacher’s 
listening to children cannot be achieved by understanding children “scientifically” through knowledge of 
developmental psychology. To understand children empathically is also not sufficient as a 
characterization of the essence of the dialogic listening. Simply speaking, listening to students is to 
discover the possibilities hidden within them, just as Dostoevsky listened to “ideas not yet fully emerged.” 
More precisely, a teacher should discover the new questions that are latent in students. 
The typical example of this type of teacher’s listening is the lesson about the poem “Spring,” as I 
examined above. In this lesson, the teacher, Tsukamoto, discovered through the apparently incorrect 
answers of the children an unexpected and new unknown question. The question the teacher asked the 
children was about the meaning of the word “te-fu-te-fu” which was apparently the typical known-
information question. However, any question potentially has an infinite number of meanings or queries 
from it other than the meaning proposed by its addresser. The children caught in the question a different 
meaning other than that which the teacher proposed, though they did not know it consciously. Listening to 
the children’s incorrect answers to his question, Tsukamoto became aware of the possibility of a new 
question and made it explicit to the children. This is a typical case of dialogic listening. 
Tsukamoto had learned this method of listening through his long experience as a teacher and it 
was not assisted by any particular theory. However, there is one theory that suggests the possibility of 
this type of dialogic listening: Gadamer’s view of “dialectics of questions and answers” (Gadamer, 1975). 
In short, this theory states that to understand a particular thought, it should be interpreted as an answer to 
a question. Furthermore, another question should be discovered to which the first question is an answer. 
Thus, we need an infinite chain of questions and answers, or dialogue to understand a particular topic at 
a deeper level. According to Gadamer (1975): 
To ask a question means to bring into the open [omitted.] The openness of a question is not 
boundless. It is limited by the horizon of the question. A question that lacks this horizon is, so to speak, floating. 
It becomes a question only when its fluid indeterminacy in concretized in a specific “this or that” [omitted.] It 
implies the explicit establishing of presuppositions, in terms of which can be seen what still remains open (p. 
357). 
The so-called horizon of the question determines the meaning of the question that I referred to 
above. Infinite horizons can be discovered in a single question and when a different horizon is selected 
for the question, the presupposition and “what remains open” of the question, changes. Consequently, the 
correct answer, as well as the wrong ones, for the same question also changes. Gadamer (1975) further 
stated, “To understand meaning is to understand it as the answer to a question” (p.368). 
Based on Gadamer’s assertions, we can derive the following. Student’s “incorrect answers” to a 
question are incorrect only in the sense that a teacher’s horizon of the question is different from students’ 
horizon of the same question. There must be some horizon for the question on which student’s apparently 
incorrect answer becomes correct. Discovering such a horizon about the question in student’s answer is 
the work of the teacher conducted through dialogic listening. Since the student is not necessarily aware of 
the horizon she/he has on a question, it is up to the teacher as the dialogic author to be aware of the 
possible horizon the students have and to make it explicit to the student. 
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Being the dialog i c  hero in a l esson 
I sometimes meet resistance from other researchers when I argue that the teacher is the dialogic 
author and the students are dialogic heroes. This resistance might be based on their understanding that 
such heroes are subservient to authors meaning that these students have no agency at all. This 
understanding would make the “co-authorship” view more attractive than the “student as heroes” view. 
However, this is a misunderstanding. If the hero is understood in the Bakhtinian sense then the hero, who 
is subservient to the author, is not the hero but one of two types: the monologic hero. There is another 
type of hero: the dialogic one. The dialogic hero, who is not controlled by the author, is characterized by 
Bakhtin (1999) as follows: 
Thus the new artistic position of the author with regard to the hero in Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel 
is a fully realized and thoroughly consistent dialogic position, one that affirms the independence, internal 
freedom, unfinalizability, and indeterminacy of the hero. For the author the hero is not “he” and not “I” but a fully 
valid “thou”, that is, another and other autonomous “I” (“thou art”). The hero is the subject of a deeply serious, 
real dialogic mode of address, not the subject of a rhetorically performed or conventionally literary one. (p.63) 
The situation is the same in the pedagogic world in which the student becomes the dialogic hero 
when the teacher becomes the dialogic author. When encountered with a teacher as a dialogic author, 
students’ utterances are unexpected for both the teacher and themselves. In doing so, the students 
reveal an “independence, internal freedom, unfinalizability, and indeterminacy.” To be a dialogic author in 
the future, a student needs to gain experience by being a dialogic hero in a world created by the teacher. 
If the student can be a dialogic author, without assistance from the teacher at the outset, then they do not 
need to enter into the so-called pedagogic world. 
 How does a student experience being a dialogic hero? To answer this question, I will share an 
example of a lesson in an elementary school in which the question was: What is a store? Katsuhiko 
Sakuma, a researcher in social studies education, developed this particular teaching material and 
conducted class lessons at various grades in elementary schools (Sakuma, 1992; Miyazaki, 2010). 
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, a store is “a place where things are kept for future 
use or sales.” The definition appears to be very clear, so that this question looks to be a typical “the 
known-information question” when asked in the classroom. But is it really so? Would this be the same for 
a vending machine: is it a store or not? What about a self-service laundry? Is a peddler also a store? In 
the definition cited above, the store is defined as “a place.” Based on this definition, a vending machine is 
not a store since it is not a place, while a peddler is not a place but a human being.  
However, there are certainly some commonalities between a grocery store, a vending machine 
and a peddler. How can we characterize the commonalities? At least in Japanese commercial law, there 
is no clear definition of a “store.” When asked by Sakuma, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
the office, which regulates the commercial activities in Japan, could not answer the question if a vending 
machine was in fact a store. Such difficulty of characterizing the concept of a “store” is not accidental 
since it reflects the rapid transformation commercial activities are undergoing in these days, especially 
when various types of new stores, which are different from traditional stores in many aspects, are being 
established. So, this question is the unknown question that has a certain value that needs to be explored 
in the lesson, contrary to its apparent ease. 
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Sakuma presented five photos at the beginning of his lesson; a grocery store, a barbershop, a 
self-service laundry, a vending machine, and a peddler. Then he asked the students whether or not these 
could be called a “store.” Most students believed that the answers were easy. For example, a grocery 
store was a store while a vending machine was not. In the lesson, which I observed, the reasons 
included: “because there is no employee,” “because there is no building,” and “because it is a self-
service.” However, one student stated contrary saying that it was a store because owner of the machine 
could receive money from the sales. One student responded by stating that it was not a store because 
goods were often “sold-out” in a vending machine. The other objected to it stating that items in grocery 
stores also become “sold-out.” The students also had discussions on the topics of self-service laundries 
and peddlers. Though the number of students who said that these three were a store increased, the 
students could not reach an agreement by the end of the lesson. Sakuma closed the lesson by requesting 
that the students go home and ask adults the same question to examine additional points of view. 
In this case, Sakuma’s lesson was dialogic in the sense that he created a world of dialogue by 
presenting unknown questions to the students. Then, how did students experience being the dialogic 
heroes? After the lesson, one student commented, “Before the lesson, I thought that it was not a store if 
there was no employee. Now, I am not sure. I had thought that a self-service laundry was not a store 
though it is inside a building and I pay money there. Now, I am lost” (Sakuma 1992, p. 38. Originally in 
Japanese, translated to English by the author). 
This comment in which the student felt “lost” shows the change that she experienced during the 
lesson. At the beginning of the lesson, she believed that she fully understood the meaning of a “store.” In 
Bakhtin’s terms, her understanding of a store was finalized. By the end of the lesson, her opinion had 
changed since her understanding of stores had become unfinalized and indeterminate. This unfinalization 
of her knowledge had become possible in the exploration of the unknown question posed by the teacher 
as the dialogic author. This is a typical example of a student’s experience as a dialogic hero in which the 
student, as the dialogic hero, encounters different views from other students as other heroes. The 
encounters make it possible for students to strengthen old beliefs or develop individual views based on 
their former beliefs, resulting in the construction of new beliefs. Or, as it happened in the episode above, 
the students ultimately felt doubtful and “lost” about their former beliefs. In any case, these encounters 
make it possible for the student to unfinalize their “finalized” understandings of the original question. At 
the same time, the finalized question becomes the question again. 
 
Learners are not heroes and heroines of their teacher’s polyphonic teaching: A 
reply-disagreement to Kiyo 
(by Eugene Matusov) 
Dear Kiyo— 
Let me start my reply to your very helpful and thoughtful essay with appreciation and agreement 
and then move to my respectful disagreements with your fruitful dialogic position. As far as I know, 
independently from Timothy Lensmire (1997), like him, you try to translate Bakhtin’s literary analysis of 
Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novels into the educational concept of polyphonic teaching. Specifically, both 
Tim and you have claimed that the educational relationship between the teacher and the student is 
parallel to the literary relationship between the author of a novel and his/her novel characters (i.e., literary 
“heroes” and “heroines”). I have found this move to be extremely useful and productive, although, at the 
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end of the day, I do not fully agree with it. I highly appreciate your and Tim’s conceptual claim exactly 
because it helps me articulate my own position in dialogic disagreement with and response to it and, thus, 
I see you as not necessarily willing, but still co-authors of my own position, with which you disagree. I am 
not sure I would be able to articulate my position without you. Thanks a lot for that. 
I agree with the following points that you have made or are consequential of your position: 
1) I strongly agree with you and Tim that the teacher is an author. As I argue elsewhere (Matusov, 
2011a; Matusov & Brobst, 2013), any teaching, monologic or dialogic, is authorial both from a 
pedagogical point of view (i.e., how to teach better his or her students this particular curricular 
material) and an epistemological point of view (i.e., how to know better for the teacher as a learner 
him/herself and with the students) (Matusov, 2009a). I do not need to articulate this position more 
because I believe that you articulated this argument very well in your essay and previous work 
(Lensmire, 1997; Miyazaki, 2011). 
2) I agree with both of your arguments for dialogic relations between the teacher and the student. Both 
you and Tim (Lensmire, 1997) have identified several qualities of these dialogic relations including:  
a. assuming by the teacher the non-transparency of students’ consciousness (i.e., not anything 
that a student does and says can be understood by the teacher for cultural and personal 
reasons) (cf. Matusov, 2011b); 
b. accepting legitimacy of students’ not wanting their teachers to follow the meaning of their 
work or contributions (i.e., a student’s insistence on privacy of his/her thoughts and 
contributions at times); 
c. focusing on promoting students’ responsive authorship – students’ creative inquires and 
contributions in response to the teacher’s dialogic provocations (cf. Matusov, 2011a; 
Matusov & Brobst, 2013), 
d. The teacher can present “puzzles” to the children, that is, the teacher discovers the kernel in 
the teaching material and produces a stimulating question about it, which is called yusaburi, 
and literally means “shaking up.” When children maintain certain views of the teaching 
material, especially commonsense views, the teacher intentionally presents different views, if 
not his/her own voice, then in contrast to the children’s view to make them rethink their fixed 
views. So in Saitou pedagogy, the teacher sometimes intentionally opposes the children. In 
this regard, the Saitou teacher is completely different from “the teacher as a facilitator of 
student-initiated inquiries”—the view common to some American educational researchers 
(Miyazaki, 2011, p. 40, italics is original); 
e. careful listening to the students and engaging with the students in a genuine non-known 
information seeking dialogue, 
I compare the teacher in Saitou pedagogy to the author of polyphonic 
novels, as Bakhtin described in his essay on Dostoevsky (Bakhtin, 1999; 
Miyazaki, 2009). Children in the Saitou classroom can be compared to the 
heroes of a polyphonic novel. Contrary to heroes in a monologic novel, in the 
polyphonic novel, heroes generate voices new even for their author, and can 
oppose the author. However, it is the author who controls the heroes’ behavior. 
This is similar for the Saitou teacher. Children become dialogic learners only via 
the teacher’s interaction with them (Miyazaki, 2011, p. 40). 
3) I agree, but agree only to a point, not wholeheartedly, that teaching involves certain aestheticization of 
his or her students treating them as characters, heroes and heroines, of the teacher’s own imaginary 
teaching drama called “lesson.” In my past work with Mark Smith, that we symptomatically called 
“teaching imaginary children” (Matusov & Smith, 2007), we analyzed monologic teaching in which 
educators are involved in, using Bakhtin’s terms about literary authorship (Bakhtin, 1999), excessive 
finalizing and objectivizing of their students. The educators, we described, made definite, high 
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certainty statements about their students and treated them as objects of their pedagogical actions. In 
our paper, Mark Smith and I called out educators for subjectivizing and problematizing their students, 
which, in my view, seems not dissimilar to your and Tim’s call for the polyphonic treating of students 
as active heroes of their teaching. We argue that it is OK for a teacher to finalize his or her students 
by making observations or predictions or inferences or having expectations based on the teacher’s 
prior experiences. However, it is very important to treat these finalizing views as temporary 
hypotheses begging for testing with the students; and others’ input rather than final true portrayal of 
the students’ subjectivities. Similarly, it may be occasionally OK for teachers to treat their students as 
objects of their pedagogical actions, but it is important to bear in mind that teachers primarily work 
with students’ subjectivities, which is not an object but rather a partner in dialogue. Finally, I agree 
with you that teacher’s dialogic aestheticization of students, based on problematizing and 
subjectivizing the students, does not suppress the students’ agency but rather promotes it (but only to 
a point, see below). On the contrary, by developing new, genuine, “unknown information seeking”, 
questions for the students and testing his or her hypotheses about the students in imaginary and real 
teaching drama, the teacher can actively promote students’ agency. In such a case, and as in literary 
dialogic aestheticization of a novel’s characters, the novel’s characters (and students) are able to 
surprise the author and be his or her partners in never ending dialogue. Educational dialogic 
aestheticization of students involves students being able to surprise their teacher and be his or her 
partners in never ending dialogue as you and Tim so nicely described in your scholarship. 
4) I agree with you and Tim that some monologic and dialogic teachers treat their students primarily as 
heroes and heroines of their teaching (but I try not to be one of them J) equating the teacher’s 
“novelist’s power” with guidance,  
One of the strengths of imagining the workshop teacher as a novelist is that it 
makes teacher power harder to ignore. For we think of novelists as moving with power in 
relation to their characters, as creating and controlling them, as writing them into roles 
within a larger creative design that determines who they are, how they act, what they will 
be. The roles that workshops offer student-characters are different from those offered in 
traditional classrooms. Workshop student-characters enjoy an expanded control over the 
topics, purposes, audiences, and processes they will take up in their school writing. This 
expanded control, however, does not escape or transcend the teacher-as-novelist’s plan, 
nor does it escape the larger context of schooling. Rather, the students’ expanded control 
is part of the plan. In other words students don’t escape teacher power in the workshop, 
they confront a teacher power pursued with different means and toward a different end 
(Lensmire, 1997, p. 383).  
It is a good description of some espoused and in-action educational theories but, in my view, it is 
a misleading prescription. Here is where our disagreements apparently start. 
I strongly, but respectfully, disagree with you, Kiyo, and with Tim Lensmire that teacher’s 
aestheticization11 of his or her students, even dialogic aestheticization, should be the primary means of 
defining the teacher-student relations in education. In short, in my dialogic teaching, I do NOT WANT to 
treat my students as heroes and heroines of my polyphonic teaching, rather I want to treat my students as 
authors authoring their own learning and lives — as learners who have the highest authority on their own 
learning (and lives) (Klag, 1994). My authorial goal as a teacher is to support and facilitate my students 
authoring their own education when it is needed and asked for. I believe that the parallel between literary 
artwork, studied by Bakhtin, and (dialogic) pedagogy has its limits. At some point, polyphonic teaching is 
not like polyphonic novel. Let me elaborate and justify my point of dissent. 
                                                       
11 I use the term “aesthetics” as a particular form of transgredient finalizing of the other after Bakhtin (1990). See Bakhtin’s notions of 
dialogic finalizing (Bakhtin, 1999) and also Mark Smith’s and my application of this notion to education (Matusov, 2009a). 
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First, I agree with Alexander Sidorkin that the importance of teaching is overrated (over-
prioritized) in education (Sidorkin, 2009).  Teaching is secondary in education. The primary focus in 
education is always on the learner’s own, autodidactic, learning and study (as specifically effortful 
learning). Teaching is aimed only on structuring and facilitating the primary processes rooted in the 
learner. Not didactics but autodidactics is primary in education. Teaching supports students’ autodidact 
efforts when needed and asked for. Education can exist without teaching. What is important is not the 
teacher’s pedagogical and epistemological authorship but rather the learner’s epistemological12 and 
pedagogical13 self-authorship. The learner is always the primary author of his or her own learning – 
whether his or her teacher recognizes it or not. Authorship cannot be given to the student by the teacher 
but rather, it can only be recognized and promoted by the teacher. If a learner is a hero or heroine, he or 
she is primarily educational self-hero or self-heroine. The learner is firstly the hero/heroine for him/herself 
and only then for the teacher. Using literary metaphor, a learner is a hero/heroine of his/her own, not the 
teacher’s, novel. The teacher’s aestheticization of his or her students in not even secondary but, I am 
afraid, it is fourth in the row of pedagogical importance, after the learner’s self-authorship, learner’s self-
aestheticization, the teacher’s pedagogical authorship, and, finally, the teacher’s aestheticization of his or 
her students14. 
Second, it can be true that both you, Kiyo, and Tim in the teachers’ treating their students as 
polyphonic heroes/heroines may promote students’ agency and authorship as you have convincingly 
described above and elsewhere (Lensmire, 1994, 1997; Miyazaki, 2011). However, in my view, this 
dialogic approach promotes mostly a particular authorship in the students – what I call “responsive 
authorship”, -- at the expense of “self-generated authorship.” Students’ responsive authorship is mostly 
promoted in response to the teacher’s dialogic provocations (and other students’ provocations that are 
often caused by the teacher’s major provocations). Again, your description and analysis above are good 
cases of students’ responsive authorship. In contrast, in my view, your dialogic approach seems to 
neglect students’ self-generated authorship when they assign themselves learning activities and send 
themselves on extensive learning journeys (or even have the opportunity to extend responsive authorship 
in authorial direction). As I described elsewhere there is no a clear-cut distinction between these types of 
students’ dialogic authorship but nevertheless they constitute distinguishing qualities requiring different, 
and at times conflicting, types of teacher’s support (Matusov, 2011a; Matusov & Brobst, 2013). 
Specifically, as I argued elsewhere, teacher’s support of learners’ self-generated authorship 
requires that the teacher promotes learners’ freedom, involves legitimizing learners’ non-cooperation, 
non-collaboration, disengagement, and dissensus with how the learners and the teacher define learning, 
education, and the importance of education in the life of the learners. This respect for negative freedoms 
(i.e., “freedoms from” rather than “freedom for”) by the teacher, on which the learners’ self-authorship is 
essentially based, is essentially the teacher’s respect of the learners’ temporal, spatial, and physical 
freedom from the teacher. It is the teacher’s respect of the student’s agency15 shown through the 
legitimacy for the learners’ unilateral and legitimate dissociation and divorce from the teacher. Literary 
characters cannot leave the novel, and the novel writer, without the writer’s final consent. In a dialogic 
pedagogy exclusively focused on promoting students’ responsive authorship, students-as-heroes must 
please the teacher by accepting the teacher’s dialogic provocations and assignments, 
                                                       
12 I.e., searching for truth. 
13 I.e., promoting their own learning. 
14 Also, students’ aestheticization of the teacher and the teacher’s self aestheticization have to be considered. 
15 In my view, a teacher should respect a student’s existing and emerging agency rather than grant and allow it within the teacher’s 
own “novel” (i.e., overall dialogic provocation-assignment), like you and Tim seem to suggest, “We grant children a certain agency 
within the context of the workshop -- by allowing children’s interests, desires, experiences, to guide their own and teacher’s work -- 
but this agency might make it less likely that they gain access to resources they need to move with agency and power outside the 
workshop” (Lensmire, 1997, p. 388, italics is mine). 
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Now Anita had a problem, for she didn’t want to write about her father. Anita hadn’t 
spelled it out in her notebook, and Ms. Meyer didn’t know: Anita didn’t want to write about her 
father because he physically abused her and her brother. But how can she not write about this 
hot topic and still please her teacher, Ms. Meyer? And if she doesn’t want to tell Ms. Meyer about 
her relationship with her father, she can’t even reveal her real reasons for avoiding this topic 
(Lensmire, 1997, p. 383, italics is mine). 
Anita, a student-heroine, of a novelist teacher, Ms. Meyer, in a writing workshop does not have 
freedom to walk away from the novelist teacher’s assignment or from the workshop itself (or from the 
school). In my view, learners can, do, and should be able to legitimately leave the educational drama (i.e., 
a lesson), prepared by the teacher, and leave the teacher. I insist that for promoting learners’ self-
generated authorship, a dialogic teacher should appreciate both his or her learners’ take over of the 
curricula and instruction AND will to divorce the teacher. The latter can be especially painful to appreciate 
by any teacher, but still necessary. 
I argue that in contrast to the responsive authorship that you, Kiyo, seem to embrace as the major 
dialogic virtue, learners’ self-generated authorship is essentially transcending and, hence, anti-
aesthetic16. Saying all of that, of course, the dialogic teacher’s aestheticization of his or her students can 
still be important even for promoting learners’ self-generated authorship through the teacher’s recognition 
and validation of the learners’ creativity of transcending the given. However, the teacher is not necessarily 
the only, or primary audience, for the learners’ self-generated authorship. The teacher can be the primary 
and/or only audience (besides the learner him or herself) but it is not necessary or, arguably, even 
desirable.  
Finally, besides the listed agentive objections, I have a corporeal 17  objection against the 
unrestricted parallel between a polyphonic novel and polyphonic teaching. In contrast to literary novel 
characters created by, and living in, the writer’s imagination (and later in readers’ imagination), real 
students are corporeal and engaged in intense ethical responsibility based relationships with their 
teacher. Learners and their teachers share the corporeal, ontological world, full of ethical tensions and 
ontological at- and dis-tractions. Learners and teachers are both ontologically and essentially thrown in 
the world that provides them with limited control and demands responsibility for their own deeds 
regardless of the level of their control. I wonder if it is a legacy of the monologic chronotope of 
conventional education, uncritically accepted by you, Kiyo and, to a bit lesser degree, Tim, that education 
can be bracketed and purified from messy, disorderly (or differently orderly), and, at time, violent life, 
disputing the teacher’s “novel”, -- what literary writers can legitimately and successfully do and enjoy in 
their imagination, (but teachers of student’s with lives in and out of the classroom cannot). Such teachers 
have an illusion that they and their students essentially live only in the didactic space of the shared 
curriculum, instruction, and self-contained purely epistemological inquiries. Novelistic teachers often have 
an illusion of ontological control over the life of their classroom (and students). For literary authors, life 
usually interferes only after their literary imaginative work is done as it was unfortunately done in the case 
of the author of “The satanic verses” (Rushdie, 1989, 2012), who was persecuted for his writing by the 
Iranian theocratic authorities. In contrast to literacy artwork, in any teaching, life interferes all the time 
                                                       
16 I have noticed that Bakhtin dropped the concept of aesthetics that he defined as finalization/consummation of the other, self, and 
the world in his early work (1990) when he moved to his dialogic framework (1999). I could not find in his later work, criticizing the 
concept of finalization, any dialogic reconceptualization of the notion of aesthetics and, thus, I suspect that Bakhtin consciously or 
unconsciously might come to a realization that the notion of aesthetics may be incompatible with the notion of dialogue. When I 
contacted a group of international Bakhtinian philologists on the bakhtin-dialogism@lists.shef.ac.uk list serv (July-August, 2009), 
they supported the latter suspicion of mine. 
17 Again after Bakhtin, I argue that the notion of responsibility rooted in ethical tensions is essentially corporeal (Bakhtin, 1999, 1993, 
1999). 
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and, in my view, dialogic teaching should appreciate and actively embrace it. Teachers do not have the 
luxury of temporally bracketing out real life, as writers do. The life in education is and should be deedful, 
ethically charged, and eventful with limited control by all the involved parties (i.e., students and teachers) 
for which they still must take responsibility. An author of a novel can kill his or her hero and it would 
constitute an aesthetic event, while harming a student would constitute an ethic, moral, and, potentially, 
criminal event for the teacher. Education cannot and should not be purified and aesthetized in the name 
of epistemology and high culture (you, Kiyo) or social justice (Tim). Education should be above life but 
also embedded in life itself. I argue that, in contrast to literary artwork, in teaching in general and in 
dialogic teaching specifically, the ethical teacher-student relationship focusing on responsibility for the 
teacher’s and students’ own deeds (“postupki” in Russian) should take priority over any aesthetic concern 
in teacher-student relationship. 
What do you think? 
 
My reply to Eugene’s comment about my argument on the learner as the 
dialogic hero 
(by Kiyotaka Miyazaki) 
I have already noted that I sometimes meet with strong opposition about my “the teacher as the 
dialogic author/ the learner as the dialogic hero” view, and the opposition is based on a simple 
misunderstanding on Bakhtin’s idea of two types of hero. Your criticism on my view is, of course, not 
based on this kind of misunderstanding. Though you avoid the term “hero” in your argument, your 
characterization of the learner as one having “the responsive authorship” seems to correspond to my 
characterization of the learner as the dialogic hero. I think this way because, in both characterizations, 
learners are thought to become an active agent in a lesson through the teacher’s work as the dialogic 
author. Maybe this claim is too rough and not acceptable to you. But let me suppose this way temporarily 
because there are other, more crucial disagreements between us other than this issue. 
On the dichotomy between the responsive authorship and the se l f  -  generated authorship 
Now let me discuss about these more crucial disagreements between us. The first issue is about 
your dichotomy between the responsive authorship and the self-generated authorship. Though you argue 
that there is no clear-cut distinction between these types of students’ dialogic authorship, you 
substantially describe these two types as mutually exclusive opponents. Moreover, you seem to argue 
that the promotion of the responsive authorship hinders the development of the self-generated authorship 
when you take up the example of Anita from Lensmire (1997). You argue that students must please the 
teacher in a lesson in which the teacher exclusively focuses on promoting students’ responsive 
authorship. You use the strong word “must.” However, you do not explain why the teacher’s effort to 
promote students’ responsive authorship necessarily positions a student as the one who must please the 
teacher. 
Certainly, students sometimes try to please their teacher in a classroom, reading and following 
the teacher’s intention. In Japanese educational world, such students are called “Yoi  – Ko”, or “a good 
kid” with the implication that they are really not good. Japanese dialogic teachers are very sensitive to 
such students’ behavior. For them, the appearance of this behavior means that their dialogic teaching 
does not work well. They want students to not fear anyone, including teachers (Saitou, 1969). 
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I cannot find out any reason to suppose that the dialogic author as I define her/him “must” 
produce “Yoi – Ko” students’ behavior. Of course, students will have no chance to please the teacher if 
they have no relations to the teacher regardless of whether or not she/he is dialogic. However, such a 
teacher is already not a teacher. Generally speaking, when two persons have a relationship of any kind, 
there is always a possibility that one tries to please, or plays up to the other. To deal with these “good 
kids”, the teacher should be sensitive to this type of students’ behavior, and once after she/he becomes 
aware of an appearance of such student’s behavior, she/he should discover in the behavior of the student 
the germ of autonomy and help her/him to grow as an autonomous agent. Just allowing her/him to leave 
from the teacher does not solve the problem. 
I do not think that the learner, or the human being in general, has two types of authorship, or 
agency. Human beings are an agent by nature.  In the sense that no one can put agency into some other, 
agency of human being is self-generated. Simultaneously, agency in human being develops by 
interacting with other people. The learner can enter into the dialogic lesson and act as the dialogic 
heroine/hero because she/he is originally an agent. Her/his experience of being the dialogic heroine/hero 
in the dialogic lesson helps her/his agency grow up. 
Can a lesson be puri f i ed and dissoc iated from real  l i f e?  
Our second disagreement is about your “corporeal objection.” You mentioned that Miyazaki 
accepts uncritically that “education can be bracketed and purified from messy, disorderly (or differently 
orderly), and, at time, violent life.” You also mentioned that the teachers Miyazaki introduced “have an 
illusion that they and their students essentially live only in the didactic space of the shared curriculum, 
instruction, and self-contained purely epistemological inquiries.” Sorry to misguide you as I did not 
describe these issues much so far, but these two statements are simply not the fact. 
My description of the teacher as the dialogic author is based on the long time experiences of the 
Japanese teachers in, most cases, the public schools, and not a fantasy based on some theoretical 
considerations. These teachers do not have an illusion that their activities in schools can be done in some 
kind of purified space dissociated from real life. They cannot. They know very well that their effort to 
produce the dialogic lesson has only a limited influence on their students and their lesson is very 
vulnerable to the forces from the outside, real world. 
Kihaku Saitou, one of the most influential teachers of the Japanese dialogic pedagogical school 
and to whom I owe much to the development of my own view of dialogic pedagogy, repeatedly expressed 
that the teacher’s work is frail. For example, Saitou (1963) said, “Education is powerless. Teacher’s work 
is frail and lonely” (p. 13). 
Saitou’s statement has several implications. One is the vulnerability of teaching to various 
influences from real life. Saitou (1970a) said, “Education is dependent to politics by nature. It is most 
easily affected by powers outside of the classroom. So, it is natural that education is powerless to 
politics”(p.6). Not just politics. It is also vulnerable to the local community, parents, media, and so on. The 
real life outside of the classroom has many influences, good and bad, on the classroom, and 
consequently, what the teacher can do is limited. This is the unquestionable premise for Saitou and other 
Japanese dialogic teachers. 
Saitou’s understanding that education is frail is concerned with teacher’s relation to students, too. 
Saitou (1963) said, “The teacher are oftentimes betrayed, criticized, and given a hard time by children on 
whom she/he worked with all her/his heart” (p.11).  Saitou’s expression such as “the betrayal of children” 
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might make readers think that Saitou was a tyrannical teacher who wanted his children placed under his 
control. Definitely not. Saitou knew that people would view such expressions as haughty. Still, he argued 
that it is also natural for teachers as person to feel like that. This statement is a cynical way for Saitou to 
admit that children are autonomous agents whom the teacher cannot fully control.  
The awareness of the teacher’s powerlessness did not make Saitou and other Japanese teachers 
give up effort to be the author of the dialogic lesson and leave everything to the learner. On the contrary, 
it is the springboard for the Japanese dialogic teacher to commit himself or herself to the teacher’s work 
as the dialogic author. After saying that education is powerless, he continued, “when the teacher 
becomes aware of her/his work’s frailness, powerlessness, and loneliness, she/he will acquire new 
strength”(Saitou, 1963, p.13). 
Japanese teachers know that a lesson is not only vulnerable to the influences from the real world. 
Lessons also occupy just a small part within the learners’ activities in school, much less in their lives. Still, 
Japanese dialogic teachers believe that they should strive to make lessons dialogic, even if they are not 
sure if they will achieve this goal, because they believe that they can do something for the learners only in 
a lesson. Saitou described this belief in the following way. “The teacher does not need to take the 
responsibility for children’s future. She/he should take the responsibility only for each lesson”(Saitou, 
1970b, p.234).” 
As for the content of the lesson, the Japanese dialogic teachers, and I too, believe that it is 
important for learners to learn your so-called high culture, or epistemological contents. However, I do not 
think that the learners in the Japanese dialogic lesson are fully shut off from your so-called ontological 
issue and the real life issue when they learn your so-called epistemological, high culture contents. As I 
have already noted in my response to your description of ontological dialogue and epistemological 
dialogue as mutually exclusive categories, I think that ontology and epistemology are two aspects of any 
relation between two participants. So, the relation between the learning material (like a poem) and the 
learner (and/or the teacher) always has the epistemological aspect and the ontological aspect. When the 
learner (and/or the teacher) takes some epistemological stance toward the learning material, she/he 
simultaneously makes some ontological commitment to the learning material. I have already introduced 
the case in which the teacher read the poem for preparing a lesson about it. In this case, the teacher 
interpreted the poem by connecting it with the lives of his friends and himself. This case shows that the 
apparently pure epistemological conduct of interpreting the modern poem, the typical high culture 
product, relates closely to the ontological conduct of examining how to live in the real life. In this sense, 
the Japanese teachers always try to relate the lesson in the classroom to the real life affairs of the 
learners. 
Final remark 
Finally, I cannot suppress presenting my basic question about your work. I cannot understand 
why you commit yourself to the pedagogy. As far as I understand, the pedagogy is the human endeavor 
to engage with others actively to facilitate their learning and the development of their agency. According 
to you, such an active engagement will hinder the development of his so-called self-generated authorship, 
and make people responsive. The learners who can leave the lesson by themselves and ask the 
“teacher’s” help will no longer need someone who tries to have the pedagogical relationship with them. 
They will be able to make use of anyone to get some help she/he needs when necessary. So, she/he 
does not need “the teacher”, much less “the pedagogy”. Then, why do you need pedagogy?   
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Your strong request to the teachers that they should allow their students to leave the lesson is not 
fully incomprehensible to me. As Foucault (1995) stated in his argument about the panopticon, formal 
education has a feature that it disciplines people to be dependent to the powers that be. And there are 
many teachers who are not aware of that feature of school. They are not aware of their works’ frailness, 
either. They should be aware of the fact that their efforts with good intention often times make their 
students the monologic hero/heroine and deprive them of their chance to grow as a dialogic agent. 
Still, I cannot accept your request to the teacher that the teacher should do nothing to the learner 
in the lesson except to show respect for the learner’s “freedom from.”  Such a request denies the dialogic 
teachers’ continual efforts to make the lesson dialogic so that they can help the learners to be dialogic 
agents in school, which is today, becoming tougher for both teachers and students to engage in rich 
dialogic experiences. And denial as such will make the situation in schools worse than it is, just allowing 
schools to become monologic arenas dominated by monologic teachers’ voices, and through it the 
monologic voice of the powers outside of classrooms. 
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